Sector: Financial Services
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Fundamental View
AS OF 26 Nov 2025After reorganising and building up capital for the full impact of Basel 3, SMFG has recently been acquisitive to develop its next phase of growth, and now has a lower capital buffer than Mizuho.
It has a strong retail, mid and large corporate franchise in Japan, but its securities arm SMBC Nikko punches below weight.
Given its size and systemic importance, SMFG is considered too big to fail, and will be supported by the Japanese government if needed.
Business Description
AS OF 26 Nov 2025- The core unit of SMFG is Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp (SMBC), whose main predecessors were Sumitomo Bank and Mitsui Bank.
- SMFG's group companies include the securities firm SMBC Nikko, SMBC Trust Bank, SMBC Card Company, SMBC Consumer Finance, Sumitomo Mitsui Finance and Leasing, SMFG India Credit Company (SMICC), Sumitomo Mitsui DS Asset Management, and SMBC Aviation Capital.
- SMFG does not have a large trust business as Sumitomo Trust and Chuo Mitsui Trust chose not to join SMFG, but merged with each other to form the separate Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings.
- It has been acquisitive over the years, particularly in emerging Asia and leasing assets. In 2021, the group took a 49% stake in Vietnam's FE Credit, 74.9% of Indian NBFI Fullerton Capital (now called SMICC), 4.99% of Philippines' RCBC, and 4.5% of US investment bank Jefferies. In 2022, it increased its stake in RCBC to 20%. In 2023, it acquired a 15% stake in Vietnam's VP Bank, and increased its stake in Jefferies from 4.5% to 15%, and in 2024 took its stake in SMICC to 100%. In 2025 it took a 24% stake in India's Yes Bank, and increased its Jefferies stake to 20%.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 26 Nov 2025SMFG has the strongest Japan retail franchise amongst its peers, and a very strong corporate banking franchise.
Similar to the other megabanks, SMFG aims to focus more on the US, and reduce low return RWAs in Europe and Asia ex-Japan.
SMFG has made a number of acquisitions and taken stakes in banks and NBFIs in Vietnam, the Philippines, India and Indonesia. The group took JPY 135 bn of goodwill impairments in FY24 on its Vietnam investments. RoE on these investments has been poor.
It has increased its 15% stake in Jefferies to 20%, to develop revenue opportunities for SMBC Nikko. Further investments in SMBC Nikko will be required.
Its CET1 ratio buffer is ~200 bp, which we would like to see maintained.
Key Metric
AS OF 26 Nov 2025| JPY bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest Revenue/Average Assets | 0.64% | 0.68% | 0.70% | 0.82% | 0.88% |
| Operating Income/Average Assets | 1.23% | 1.26% | 1.39% | 1.44% | 1.58% |
| Operating Expense/Operating Income | 62% | 61% | 60% | 58% | 53% |
| Pre-Impairment Operating Profit / Average Assets | 0.48% | 0.51% | 0.58% | 0.60% | 0.79% |
| Impairment charge/Average Loans | (0.31%) | (0.22%) | (0.27%) | (0.32%) | (0.16%) |
| ROAA | 0.30% | 0.32% | 0.36% | 0.41% | 0.64% |
| ROAE | 5.9% | 6.5% | 7.0% | 8.0% | 12.5% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 02 Feb 2026SMFG’s banking business had performed well, while its non-bank subsidiaries had underperformed over FY21-22. The group had a better 2H vs a poor 1H23, with improved trading and fee revenues, partially offset by higher credit costs at the non-bank businesses. The group became acquisitive from 2021, taking a 49% stake in a leading Vietnamese NBFI and 15% of its parent (VP Bank), 20% of RCBC of the Philippines, 74.9% of NBFI Fullerton India (now 100%), 4.5% in US IB Jefferies (increasing to 20%), and 24% of India’s Yes Bank for the next stage of growth. Its high CET1 ratio has been whittled down by acquisitions. FY24 results were boosted by share sales and structured investment trusts, 9M25 showed a large jump on base effects. Govt. support is assured. We like its PerpNC10 AT1s for duration.
Recommendation Reviewed: February 02, 2026
Recommendation Changed: August 05, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 26 Nov 2025MUFG is the largest of Japan’s three megabanks, and has the most diversified operations by business line and geography. It had also been the most acquisitive till the early 2020s.
Core profitability had been weak due to Japan’s ultra-low interest rates and growth; that improved post an efficiency drive and a CEO change in April 2020; the bank has improved international margins and fee income, and benefits from rising domestic interest rates.
Given its size and systemic importance, MUFG is considered too big to fail, and will be supported by the Japanese government if needed.
Business Description
AS OF 26 Nov 2025- The 2 main banks of MUFG are MUFG Bank (earlier Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ or BTMU) & Mitsubishi UFJ Trust & Banking. In the early stages of Japan's long banking crisis, Bank of Tokyo merged with Mitsubishi Bank, and in the late stages they absorbed UFJ (former Sanwa Bank & Tokai Bank) while Mitsubishi Trust absorbed Toyo Trust & Nippon Trust.
- The group includes consumer lenders Mitsubishi-UFJ NICOS & ACOM, and securities/IB JVs with Morgan Stanley. MUFG invested in Morgan Stanley in 2008 and now has a ~20% stake. In Dec-22, it completed the sale of its US retail and commercial bank, MUFG Union Bank, to US Bancorp.
- It has a majority stake in Thailand's Bank of Ayudhya (now Krungsri), 20% stakes in Vietnam's Vietinbank and Philippines' Security Bank, and 100% of Indonesia's Bank Danamon.
- In 2019, it acquired Colonial First State from Commonwealth Bank of Australia to strengthen its global asset management business, in 2020 it invested $700 mn in SE Asia's Grab, and more recently has bought Home Credit's Philippine and Indonesian subsidiaries, Link (an Australian pension fund administrator), auto loan companies in Indonesia, Albacore Capital, StanChart's Indonesian retail operations, and a stake in an Indian NBFI.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 26 Nov 2025Its recent divisional performance has been strong, with the domestic businesses benefiting from higher BOJ rates, and robust growth in fee income.
Credit costs have been rising because of increased exposure to personal unsecured loans in Japan and Southeast Asia, as well as higher-risk lending in Southeast Asia.
Its close relationship with Morgan Stanley has led it to take large positions in US corporate finance loans, which has been problematic on occasion.
We see limited risk from rising JGB yields as the large equity unrealised gains dwarf the unrealised losses on the bond portfolio.
Key Metric
AS OF 26 Nov 2025| JPY bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest Revenue/Average Assets | 0.57% | 0.79% | 0.64% | 0.73% | 0.73% |
| Operating Income/Average Assets | 1.11% | 1.22% | 1.23% | 1.22% | 1.48% |
| Operating Expense/Operating Income | 69% | 65% | 61% | 67% | 56% |
| Pre-Impairment Operating Profit / Average Assets | 0.34% | 0.43% | 0.48% | 0.40% | 0.65% |
| Impairment charge/Average Loans | (0.30%) | (0.61%) | (0.36%) | 0.00% | (0.12%) |
| ROAA | 0.32% | 0.30% | 0.39% | 0.47% | 0.65% |
| ROAE | 6.7% | 6.5% | 8.1% | 9.3% | 12.5% |
| CET1 post Basel 3 reforms excl. secs gains | 10.4% | 10.3% | 10.1% | 10.8% | 10.5% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 05 Feb 2026MUFG is the largest of the megabanks with more diversified business lines than its peers. Digitalisation and operational efficiency improvements, in addition to higher rates in Japan and the US, had led to much better results in FY24. Lending discipline has lifted international margins; domestic margins though lag its peers. Its ~20% shareholding in Morgan Stanley has been a boon. Its $ liquidity is the best amongst its peers, and government support is assured. Its CET1 ratio ratio has fallen to ~180 bp, which we see as low; pro-forma for the Shriram acquisition it will fall to a particularly low ~120 bp. However, we see the group’s earnings power improving from BOJ rate rises and so continue with our Market perform recommendation. We see current levels on its 6NC5 of G+68 bp as 5 bp wide.
Recommendation Reviewed: February 05, 2026
Recommendation Changed: August 05, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 18 Nov 2025Security Bank has historically been a wholesale focused bank. Rapid retail expansion pre-pandemic led to a large asset quality hit when COVID-19 struck. The bank completed revamping its underwriting processes at end-2021 and has resumed brisk growth in the retail book since.
The bank had a less well-established deposit franchise than most peers, resulting in a heavy hit to NIMs when rates rose this cycle. This has led it to focus aggressively on growing the higher yielding retail and MSME segments, the latter via forming a new business banking segment in 2022.
Previously high capital ratios have hence fallen; the CET1 ratio is a low 12-13%.
MUFG is a 20% shareholder of Security Bank.
Business Description
AS OF 18 Nov 2025- Security Bank was established in 1951 and obtained its universal banking license from the BSP in 1994. It is today the 9th largest bank in the Philippines.
- The bank is majority-owned by longtime owner Frederick Y. Dy (23.7%) and MUFG Bank (20%), which acquired its stake in April 2016.
- SB Finance, a joint venture between Security Bank and Thailand's Bank of Ayudhya (Krungsri), a consolidated subsidiary of MUFG, was launched in 2019. The unit is a consumer finance company formed to engage in the unsecured loans business in the Philippines, focusing on the lower mass retail segment.
- Security Bank's loan portfolio is 32% consumer, 4% MSME, 29% middle market and 35% corporate at 2Q25. The consumer and MSME book comprises mortgages (44%), auto loans (23%), credit card (23%) and small business loans (10%).
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 18 Nov 2025Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign would have a negative impact on Security Bank.
RRR cuts and rates coming down, along with brisk growth in higher yielding but riskier retail and MSME (business banking), are supporting the NIM well. Asset quality indicators however have unsurprisingly started to weaken with a jump in credit costs. We remain cautious given the relatively thin reserve cover and capital buffer. Management is now exercising some prudence in retail loan growth after the emergence of stress in credit cards.
Capital ratios have fallen due to brisk RWA growth and now trail peers. We view current levels as low, but do not rule out capital support from MUFG if needed.
A prolonged hit to sentiment from the flood controls scandal would exacerbate the slowdown in GDP and credit growth, and pressure asset quality.
Key Metric
AS OF 18 Nov 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest Margin | 4.43% | 4.23% | 4.49% | 4.73% | 4.70% |
| ROA | 1.0% | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.1% |
| ROE | 5.6% | 8.4% | 7.0% | 8.1% | 8.2% |
| PPP ROA | 2.30% | 2.17% | 1.97% | 2.18% | 2.40% |
| CET1 Ratio | 19.1% | 16.1% | 15.3% | 12.9% | 12.7% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 17.88% | 14.94% | 15.62% | 12.50% | 13.41% |
| Gross NPL Ratio | 3.94% | 2.95% | 3.36% | 2.85% | 3.02% |
| Net LDR | 85.7% | 83.0% | 88.8% | 84.6% | 74.6% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 150% | 144% | 158% | 178% | 189% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 138% | 122% | 131% | 130% | 143% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 19 Nov 2025Security Bank has historically been a wholesale focused bank. Rapid retail expansion leading up to the pandemic led to a large asset quality fallout. It has since resumed aggressive growth in higher yielding but riskier retail and MSME segments to counter NIM pressure. This along with improving funding costs from a declining rate environment has supported the NIM. Asset quality however is showing strains from the brisk growth in riskier segments as we had anticipated, leading it to start exercising some prudence in retail loan growth. We remain cautious about the asset quality implications given the relatively thin reserve cover and capital buffer (~12-13% CET1 ratio). We have an Underperform recommendation.
Recommendation Reviewed: November 19, 2025
Recommendation Changed: May 21, 2024
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Fundamental View
AS OF 13 Nov 2025Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) is the 3rd largest bank in the Philippines by assets.
We view the bank as too big to fail given its systemic importance in the country. There is also a strong probability of support from the government in addition to its main shareholder, the Ayala Corporation if needed.
BPI has a long history, and we view it as a fundamentally sound bank with strong and improved profitability, and comfortable liquidity. Capital management however has become less conservative, and while asset quality is relatively well managed, we are keeping an eye on strong growth in the non-wholesale book.
Business Description
AS OF 13 Nov 2025- The history of the Bank of the Philippine Islands traces back to 1851. It is the oldest bank in the Philippines and South East Asia. It was first listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange in 1971, and became a universal bank in 1982.
- Ayala Corporation, one of the biggest conglomerates in the country, became BPI's dominant shareholder in 1969. Ayala Corp still holds a 49% stake in the bank.
- BPI has been acquisitive across the years. It merged with Far East Bank and Trust Company and acquired Ayala Insurance Holdings Corp in 2000. It acquired DBS Bank Philippines in 2001 and Prudential Bank Philippines in 2005. DBS was a shareholder of BPI but exited its position in 2013. More recently in January 2024, it completed the acquisition of the Gokongwei conglomerate's Robinsons Bank.
- The bank is predominantly a corporate bank with 69% of its loan book outstanding to corporates, and the balance to MSME and retail as of 3Q25. Management is keen to skew the loan mix further towards MSME and retail.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 13 Nov 2025Direct impact from US tariffs is limited given that the Philippines is not a major goods exporter, but there will be second order effects from a slowdown in regional and global growth.
The recent public infrastructure graft scandal will dampen government spending and private investment over the next couple of quarters, weighing on GDP and corporate loan growth. A prolonged hit to sentiment would exacerbate these effects and put pressure on asset quality.
Further BSP rate cuts are likely to support growth, which will pressure the NIM. BPI, however, remains on track for NIM expansion this year, driven by a pivot toward higher-yielding retail/MSME lending, RRR reductions, and reduced liquidity drag. We see asset quality risks from the strong focus on unsecured retail and MSME growth, but BPI’s wholesale-focused book (69% of total loans) provides comfort and provisioning capacity is strong.
Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign would negatively impact BPI.
Key Metric
AS OF 13 Nov 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPP ROA | 2.01% | 2.41% | 2.52% | 2.78% | 3.02% |
| Reported ROA (Cumulative) | 1.10% | 1.59% | 1.93% | 1.98% | 2.02% |
| Reported ROE (Cumulative) | 8.4% | 13.1% | 15.4% | 15.1% | 15.0% |
| Net Interest Margin | 3.30% | 3.59% | 4.09% | 4.31% | 4.60% |
| CET1 Ratio | 15.8% | 15.1% | 15.3% | 13.9% | 14.9% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 12.1% | 12.2% | 12.4% | 13.0% | 13.7% |
| NPL Ratio | 2.49% | 1.76% | 1.84% | 2.13% | 2.29% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.91% | 0.58% | 0.22% | 0.32% | 0.68% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 221% | 195% | 207% | 159% | n/m |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 155% | 149% | 154% | 146% | n/m |
Our View
AS OF 19 Nov 2025BPI is the third largest bank in the Philippines with a long history. Its traditionally conservative approach has led to a loss of loan market share in the past, as well as a lower NIM than BDO and MBT. Recent brisk expansion in higher yielding retail and MSME loans has strongly improved profitability levels and driven NIM expansion despite rate cuts. While asset quality has slipped with the loan mix shift, it remains acceptable. However, we are watchful of risks from the strong growth in the non-wholesale book as provision reserves have been pared down to lower levels than peers. Still, we are overall comfortable with BPI given the large wholesale book (69% of loans) and underwriting record, strong provisioning capacity and comfortable liquidity. We have BPI on U/P from an RV standpoint.
Recommendation Reviewed: November 19, 2025
Recommendation Changed: May 21, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 07 Nov 2025- BDO Unibank (BDO) is the largest bank in the Philippines in terms of assets & market share.
- Given its size and systemic importance, BDO is considered too big to fail and is strongly likely to be supported by its controlling shareholder SM Investments, as well as the Philippine government in times of stress.
- BDO is widely viewed as the soundest bank in the country given its strong fundamentals, well-diversified businesses, and good management.
Business Description
AS OF 07 Nov 2025- BDO Unibank was established as Acme Savings Bank in 1968, and was then acquired by SM Investments in 1976. It became a commercial bank in 1994 and a universal bank in 1996.
- BDO was listed in May 2002. SM Investments remains the bank's largest shareholder with a 41% stake.
- BDO has expanded through a series of M&As. Among its key transactions, it merged with Dao Heng Bank Philippines in 2001, Banco Santander Philippines in 2003, UOB Philippines in 2005, Equitable PCI Bank in 2007, GE Money Bank in 2009, Citibank Savings, DB Trust and Real Bank in 2014, One Network Bank in 2015 (the largest rural bank in the Philippines), and RB Pandi's banking business in 2019. It also acquired the insurance business of Generali in the Philippines in 2016.
- BDO has the largest distribution network in the country and is ranked the largest bank in terms of consolidated resources, total assets, loans, deposits and trust funds under management.
- Its loan book was split 51% large corporates, 24% middle market, and 25% consumer at 2Q25. 41% of the consumer book comprised mortgages, 29% credit cards, 13% auto loans and the remaining personal loans (13%) and others (5%).
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 07 Nov 2025- Direct impact from US tariffs is limited given that the Philippines is not a major goods exporter, but there is likely to be some second order effects from a slowdown in regional and global growth.
- We anticipate a negative impact to loan and GDP growth from the recent public infrastructure spending corruption scandal, which will slow government spending and private investments for the next couple of quarters. Further BSP rate cuts are likely in order to support growth, which will put downward pressure on the NIM.
- We see few asset quality risks for BDO given a comfortable NPL cover (3Q25: 134%) and build up of the CET1 ratio (3Q25: 14.4%), as well as BDO’s large corporates book (~50% of total loans) and underwriting track record.
- Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign would negatively impact BDO.
Key Metric
AS OF 07 Nov 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NIM | 4.05% | 4.14% | 4.37% | 4.35% | 4.29% |
| Reported ROA (Cumulative) | 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.7% |
| Reported ROE (Cumulative) | 10.4% | 13.0% | 15.2% | 15.1% | 14.1% |
| Equity/Assets | 11.7% | 11.3% | 11.5% | 11.8% | 11.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.6% | 13.4% | 13.8% | 14.1% | 14.4% |
| NPL ratio | 2.8% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.8% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.72% | 0.64% | 0.59% | 0.46% | 0.44% |
| PPP ROA | 2.1% | 2.3% | 2.7% | 2.5% | 2.4% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 145% | 141% | 123% | 132% | 143% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 124% | 124% | 124% | 122% | n/m |
CreditSights View
AS OF 07 Jan 2026BDO Unibank (BDO) is the largest bank in the Philippines by assets and market share, regarded as the country’s most sound financial institution due to its strong fundamentals, diversified businesses, and effective management. Its systemic importance makes it highly likely to receive support from SM Investments (its major shareholder) and the government during stress periods. While direct exposure to US tariffs is minimal, BDO faces risks from slower regional growth and domestic challenges such as the recent infrastructure spending corruption scandal, which may dampen loan and GDP growth. Further BSP rate cuts to stimulate the economy could pressure net interest margins, but asset quality remains robust with a high NPL cover (134%) and CET1 ratio of 14.4%. The bank’s loan portfolio is dominated by large corporates (~51%), supported by a strong underwriting track record. Any downgrade of the Philippine sovereign rating could negatively affect BDO. Its extensive M&A history and largest distribution network reinforce its leadership position in the market.
Recommendation Reviewed: January 07, 2026
Recommendation Changed: January 07, 2026
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Fundamental View
AS OF 21 Oct 2025CBA has a very strong franchise in Australia; it is the leader in the retail market and is making good progress in challenging NAB in business banking.
It has been the best managed of the Australian banks for many years, and has outperformed peers. It lost some of its luster in the latter part of the 2010s due to regulatory and compliance lapses amid charges of complacency, but has since improved into a better institution.
Its capital and liquidity position is robust, and asset quality is strong.
Business Description
AS OF 21 Oct 2025- Originally established by the Australian government in 1911, CBA functioned for some time as Australia's central bank until the establishment of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1959. It remained under government ownership until the early 1990s, after which it underwent a transformation from a bureaucratic public sector bank into a widely respected commercial organisation.
- Over the past couple of decades, CBA consolidated its position as the leading bank in Australia with a 24-28% share in household deposits and lending, helped by its acquisition of Bank of Western Australia during the 2008 crisis.
- In New Zealand it owns ASB Bank, but otherwise has been selling non-core assets, including its life insurance business.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 21 Oct 2025CBA’s financial health is closely linked to the Australian economy, in particular retail credit quality, mainly housing loans. Household confidence is improving, but they continue to be stretched; discretionary consumer spend is improving though on growth in real disposable incomes. Unemployment continues to be comfortable.
Earnings/NIMs are under pressure from strong mortgage market and deposit competition. Business banking growth however has been stellar and highly profitable.
The interest rate cuts coming through from the RBA will improve borrowers’ ability to make interest payments.
Key Metric
AS OF 21 Oct 2025| AUD mn | Y22 | Y23 | Y24 | Y25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Equity | 12.7% | 14.0% | 13.6% | 13.5% |
| Total Revenues Margin | 2.1% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| Cost/Income | 46.3% | 43.7% | 45.0% | 45.7% |
| APRA CET1 Ratio | 11.5% | 12.2% | 12.3% | 12.3% |
| International CET1 Ratio | 18.6% | 19.1% | 19.1% | 20.9% |
| APRA Leverage Ratio | 5.2% | 5.1% | 5.0% | 4.7% |
| Impairment Charge/Avg Loans | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Gross Impaired Loans/Total Loans | n/m | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.1% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 130% | 131% | 136% | 130% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 130% | 124% | 116% | 115% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 11 Feb 2026CBA operates as a well-oiled machine in the Australian banking market and is our preferred name in the space. It has the leading position in mortgages and deposits, and is challenging NAB in business banking. An AUSTRAC penalty in 2018 damaged its reputation and remediation costs impacted earnings for a couple of years. The bank sold a number of its non-bank business and equity investments to simplify and focus on its core domestic businesses. It has the highest NIM amongst the Aussie banks. Business banking growth has been stellar and highly profitable. Asset quality is comfortable. Its seniors trade tight but at an acceptable level, while its Tier 2s trade fair. It had a recent dip in performance in 1Q26 but 2Q26 was strong.
Recommendation Reviewed: February 11, 2026
Recommendation Changed: October 05, 2016
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Fundamental View
AS OF 10 Sep 2025A large impairment loss in FY20 brought CITIC AMC (formerly Huarong) to the brink of insolvency, but a state-led rescue plan provided it with liquidity support and brought its capital back above minimum requirements. CITIC has replaced the MoF as its largest shareholder. CITIC AMC remains as one of the Big 5 state-owned AMCs in China and will continue to perform national services.
On the guidance of the authorities, CITIC AMC has divested almost all of its non-core subsidiaries.
We expect its core operations to remain weak and volatile, until China’s economy is back on the upswing, residents regain confidence in the property market, and improved capital markets lead to better valuations on its securities books.
Business Description
AS OF 10 Sep 2025- China CITIC Financial Asset Management (formerly Huarong) is one of the five major state-owned asset management companies in China. It was first set up in 1999 to take over the bad debts of ICBC.
- The AMCs were originally due to be wound up after dealing with these "policy loans" that had come onto the books of the banks under government direction before their commercialisation, but the AMCs found a new role as commercial bad debt managers.
- CITIC AMC was commercialised in 2012 and completed its IPO on the HK stock exchange in 2015. Since then, it expanded its financial services to banking, financial leasing, securities & futures, trust, as well as consumer finance. However, after heavy losses in FY20, the company has divested almost all of its non-core business as directed by the authorities.
- Following the CITIC-led rescue plan and the equity transfer from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to CITIC, CITIC has become its largest shareholder (26.46%). Other significant shareholders include MOF (24.76%), Zhongbaorongxin (18.08%), Cinda AMC (4.89%), China Life Insurance (4.50%), National Social Security Fund (3.08%), Warburg Pincus (2.57%), and ICBC Financial AM (2.44%). It was renamed to share the "CITIC" brand in Nov-23.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 10 Sep 2025CITIC’s support is strong (name change, investment in CEB and CITIC Ltd, subsidiary disposal, new management team, etc.) and more meaningful to the company compared to direct ownership by the government.
Derisking continues with lower property exposure, non-core businesses have largely been disposed of and the company is able to focus on its main DDA business per the guidance of the authorities.
While the company was able to deliver profit growth on the back of CITIC support and its associate interest holdings, core performance remains weak, and there could be continued volatility in the name.
AMCs may find it harder to dispose DDAs at good valuations amid a deceleration economic cycle. Longer holding periods will dampen return yields.
Key Metric
AS OF 10 Sep 2025| CNY mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROA | 0.10% | (2.20%) | 0.02% | 0.75% | 1.10% |
| ROE | 1.0% | (49.8%) | 3.6% | 18.4% | 21.1% |
| Total Capital Ratio | 13.0% | 15.1% | 15.1% | 15.7% | 16.0% |
| Leverage Ratio | 14.2x | 16.1x | 11.5x | 10.1x | 8.6x |
| Equity/Assets | 0.0% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.7% | 4.0% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 02 Sep 2025CITIC AMC (ex-Huarong) continued to book profits 1H25, helped by investments in three listed SOEs. Core businesses remained weak and volatile, as the company continues to lower valuations on existing DDAs acquired many years ago. Its non-DDA financial assets also have a more volatile performance than peers. CITIC’s support is strong, derisking continues with a meaningful improvement in the provision coverage ratio, non-core businesses have all been cleared, and the company is able to focus on main DDA business per the authorities’ guidance. The capital adequacy ratio has improved meaningfully to 16%, surpassing Cinda. Disclosure remains poor. We expect it to trade ~30 bp wider than CCAMCL.
Recommendation Reviewed: September 02, 2025
Recommendation Changed: July 14, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 25 Jul 2025IBK benefits from a legally binding solvency guarantee from the Korean government and is viewed as a Korean quasi-sovereign issuer. The bank is listed, but remains majority state-owned. Previous governments had proposed privatizing it, but subsequent governments scrapped these plans. The government intends to keep its stake above 50%, and wants IBK to focus on lending to SMEs and provide earlier stage investment capital.
IBK manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks.
Business Description
AS OF 25 Jul 2025- IBK was established under its own Act in 1961 to assist the development of Korea's small business sector. It claims a 24% market share in SME lending.
- It was listed in the early 1990s, but was re-nationalised following heavy losses in the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. It was re-listed in 2003, and is majority owned by the government which holds 59.5%; the National Pension Scheme holds 5.6%, and other policy banks have small stakes (7.2% by Korea Development Bank and 1.8% by the Export-Import Bank of Korea).
- Under Article 43 of the IBK Act, if the bank incurs losses they should be set against its reserves and "if the reserves are not sufficient the Government shall assume the remaining loss". Although this is a solvency guarantee and not an explicit guarantee for the timely payment of debts, we believe the Korean government will ensure IBK is in a position to make such timely payments.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 25 Jul 2025The bank’s ratings are closely tied to the Korean sovereign’s ratings due to its quasi-sovereign status.
Its ratings and its default risk should therefore not be impacted by any deterioration in its financials, provided the government continues to inject new capital when needed, which it is expected to.
Its policy mandate requires it to use at least 70% of its funding for SMEs. Risks are mitigated by its granular SME exposures which are more than 80% secured, including guarantee from state-owned credit guarantee agencies. Korean governments have also always been quick to provide support including capital injections to IBK when needed, with the most recent injection of KRW 1.3 tn during the COVID.
Key Metric
AS OF 25 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Operating Profit / Average Assets | 1.30% | 1.49% | 1.59% | 1.39% | 1.34% |
| ROAA | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| ROAE | 9.2% | 9.5% | 8.8% | 8.1% | 8.8% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.67% | 0.52% | 0.44% |
| Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans | 0.85% | 0.85% | 1.05% | 1.34% | 1.37% |
| CET1 Ratio | 11.3% | 11.1% | 11.3% | 11.3% | 11.7% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 6.92% | 6.79% | 7.10% | 7.25% | 7.18% |
| NIM | 1.51% | 1.78% | 1.79% | 1.70% | 1.59% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 16 Jun 2025IBK is not wholly government owned – 59.5% direct government ownership, 7.2% KDB and 1.8% KEXIM – but is a policy bank benefiting from a Korean government solvency guarantee. For a policy bank it also has a fairly good track record and manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks. As the leading lender to Korea’s medium and small businesses, IBK plays a key role in the country’s economy, enhanced by the longstanding objective of numerous administrations to achieve a more diversified economy less reliant on the “chaebol”. Successive Korean governments have always been quick to provide support including capital injections to the policy banks when needed.
Recommendation Reviewed: June 16, 2025
Recommendation Changed: March 17, 2017
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Fundamental View
AS OF 23 Jul 2025KEXIM is a pure policy bank that is directly and indirectly wholly owned by the government of the Republic of Korea, which is obliged under Article 37 of the Export-Import Bank of Korea Act to fund any losses that cannot be covered by the bank’s reserves.
While this is a solvency guarantee and does not explicitly guarantee the timely repayment of debt, we view it as inconceivable that the Korean authorities would fail to provide KEXIM with support in a timely manner, should this be needed, given its crucial policy role and close government links.
Business Description
AS OF 23 Jul 2025- KEXIM was set up in 1976 to support Korean companies in their overseas business through export credit guarantee programs, as well as providing finance for imports and for overseas investment. It provides funding for both short term trade and long term investment, and manages two government-entrusted funds: the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), a Korean official development assistance program, and the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF), an economic cooperation program to promote exchanges with North Korea. It is also a conduit through which the government doled out COVID-19 assistance to affected companies.
- Till 2030, KEXIM aims to preferentially focus on seven sectors (hydrogen energy, wind and solar power, rechargeable battery and energy storage systems (ESS), future mobility, 5G and next-generation semiconductors, pharmaceutical and healthcare, and digital technology and cultural content) which are considered new growth drivers of the Korean economy. It has historically focused on the shipbuilding and engineering & construction industries.
- KEXIM is 100% owned by the Korean government: 76% directly and the remainder through stakes held by the Bank of Korea (7%) and Korea Development Bank (17%). In contrast to peer policy banks IBK and KDB, KEXIM has remained more consistently a policy bank but its role has been adjusted to ensure it complements rather than competes with the Korean commercial banks.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 23 Jul 2025Previous Korean governments have made moves to privatise the other policy banks, but KEXIM has retained its policy bank role and government ownership, which are not likely to change.
Korea’s shipbuilders have long been the largest users of KEXIM’s services. Losses on exposure to the sector, in particular Daewoo Shipbuilding (DSME), pushed KEXIM into the red in 2016 but the government injected capital and its condition has recovered.
Together with KDB, KEXIM has played a key role in helping corporate Korea survive the COVID-19 induced crisis.
Key Metric
AS OF 23 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY20 | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Impairment Operating Profit / Average Assets | 1.2% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.1% |
| ROAA | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.8% |
| ROAE | 0.7% | 3.2% | 2.7% | 4.7% | 5.2% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.8% | 0.3% | 0.1% |
| Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 0.7% | 0.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.4% | 13.3% | 11.8% | 12.9% | 13.9% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 14.8% | 15.1% | 12.6% | 14.3% | 16.3% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIR/Ave Assets) | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.6% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 06 Jan 2026KEXIM is a wholly government owned policy bank benefiting from a Korean government solvency guarantee. It plays a key role in financing large-ticket exports in particular ships and large-scale overseas engineering projects. Its credit exposures include some industry and borrower concentrations especially to Korea’s shipbuilders and its financial performance has at times suffered. But the Korean government has always acted in a timely manner to endure its solvency, and with this strong backing we view it as a sound credit. We view its secondary levels as in line with where we would expect it to trade, and so continue with our Market perform recommendation.
Recommendation Reviewed: January 06, 2026
Recommendation Changed: September 22, 2020
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Fundamental View
AS OF 19 May 2025The bank has historically generated higher returns than peers, but it geared its focus significantly towards the retail segment through acquiring Citi’s Philippine retail portfolio in 2022 and organic growth, which brought retail loans to more than half the total book.
Returns have suffered despite the good boost to core revenues, as asset quality deterioration from the riskier growth direction resulted in high credit costs which we have forewarned. Continued rounds of capital infusions from shareholders have thus been required. The reserve cover is maintained relatively thin.
Business Description
AS OF 19 May 2025- UnionBank of the Philippines was incorporated in 1968, and listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange in June 1992. Principal shareholders are Aboitiz Equity Ventures (49.66%), Insular Life (16%), & Social Security System (18%).
- UBP undertook mergers with International Corporate Bank in 1994 and International Exchange Bank in 2006. City Savings Bank (a thrift bank) was purchased in Jan 2013. City Savings received merger approval with PR Savings (a bank engaged in motorcycle, agri-machinery, & teachers' salary loans) in Dec 2018 from the BSP. It acquired the Citi Philippines retail franchise in 2022.
- The loan book is broadly split 38% wholesale loans and 62% retail loans (comprising 34% credit cards, 21% mortgages and 7% salary loans at the parent, 36% teachers loans, salary loans and motorcycle loans by the thrift bank subsidiary, City Savings Bank, and 1% UnionDigital) at Mar-25.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 19 May 2025Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign or reduction of shareholding by Aboitiz Equity Ventures would negatively impact UBP.
The bank’s aggressive retail expansion has improved the NIM, but negatively impacted overall profitability because of high credit costs (particularly since 2H23) which we have forewarned. We continue to dislike its focus on riskier retail given the already large loan book exposure. It is now focusing on lower risk, shorter term loans at UnionDigital, but the improvement in credit costs have been slow to come through given fallout from higher risk taking in other segments.
The bank however benefits from good shareholder support; it successfully completed a third stock rights offering of PHP 10 bn in 2Q24 (2023: PHP 12 bn; 2022: PHP 40 bn) to shore up capital. Lower opex from 2Q24 onwards is also aiding the bottomline.
Key Metric
AS OF 19 May 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1Q25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest Margin | 4.60% | 4.80% | 5.50% | 6.00% | 6.30% |
| Reported ROA (Cumulative) | 1.6% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 1.1% | 0.5% |
| Reported ROE (Cumulative) | 11.5% | 9.7% | 5.6% | 6.4% | 2.9% |
| PPP ROA | 2.59% | 2.17% | 2.31% | 3.08% | 2.74% |
| CET1 Ratio | 16.3% | 11.3% | 13.9% | 15.6% | 14.9% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 13.5% | 13.6% | 15.3% | 17.1% | 16.8% |
| Gross NPL Ratio | 5.00% | 4.80% | 6.27% | 6.89% | 6.90% |
| Net LDR | 63.1% | 67.4% | 73.8% | 77.3% | 74.6% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 272% | 148% | 163% | 250% | n/m |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 149% | 124% | 124% | 128% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 19 Aug 2025UBP’s NIM and core revenue generation is strong thanks to its pivot towards higher yielding retail via organic growth and acquiring Citi’s local retail portfolio. However, returns have suffered as the asset quality repercussions which we have forewarned from its aggressive growth strategy towards the risky retail segments have come through, with elevated credit costs since 2H23. It has slowed loan growth but credit costs have not shown signs of stabilisation given a still high appetite for risk. The reserve cover is maintained relatively thin. Continued shareholder support with yet another stock rights offering in 2Q24 has ensured sufficient capital for now. We drop coverage on UBP given the impending maturity of its sole $ bond in Oct-25.
Recommendation Reviewed: August 19, 2025
Recommendation Changed: January 01, 1970
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