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Sector: Financial Services
Woori Financial Group
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Country: Korea
- Bond: WOORIB 4.875 28
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 5.108% (Indicative as of March 2)
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Fundamental View
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Woori FG’s performance record had been less consistent than some of its more commercially focused peers but improved in FY21-22. Its FY23 performance lagged behind its peers, but FY24 profit growth was peer-leading, partially thanks to not having the ELS compensation issue which hit the other three FGs in 1Q24. 9M25 performance was softer again due to several one-offs.
Asset quality used to be a strength with the lowest NPL ratios and credit costs among the four FGs but has deteriorated since 2Q23, and we no longer see a gap with the other FGs.
Capital standing is a relative weakness but is closer than ever before to that of its peers on the back of active portfolio management.
Business Description
AS OF 05 Nov 2025- Woori's predecessor banks were rescued by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
- Woori Bank is one of Korea's 'Big Four' commercial banks. It previously owned two regional banks, Kwangju and Kyongnam, but these were spun off in 2014. Woori also sold its stake in Woori Investment Securities and its savings bank and life insurance arms to NH Financial Group.
- Woori set up a HoldCo (Woori FG) in January 2019 to expand into more diversified business lines, particularly investment banking. It used to have a HoldCo, but it was dissolved in 2014 when it was merged with Woori Bank.
- Its main subsidiaries are 100%-owned Woori Card, Woori Financial Capital (auto leasing), Woori Investment Bank and 72.3%-owned Woori Asset Trust. In August 2024, the group relaunched securities business by acquiring Korea Foss Securities and merging it with Woori Investment. The group also acquired a 75.34% stake in Tongyang Life and full ownership of ABL Life and has consolidated them since 1 July 2025.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Woori FG was for many years majority-owned by the Korean government via the Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), but KDIC has steadily sold down its shareholding, and Woori purchased and cancelled the remaining shares in 2024. That said, Woori FG remains a large, systemically important bank with strong potential government backing if needed.
Woori FG is less diversified than KB and Shinhan, with most of its earnings coming from the bank and small contributions from the card and leasing businesses. The group has accelerated its M&A pace since 2024; it relaunched securities business and acquired two insurance companies. However, It will likely take more time than expected for the new non-banking segments to make a meaningful contribution to the group.
Loan growth is expected to be more challenging given tighter regulation on mortgage lending.
Key Metric
AS OF 05 Nov 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 0.99% | 1.15% | 1.10% | 1.17% | 1.07% |
| ROA | 0.66% | 0.70% | 0.54% | 0.61% | 0.71% |
| ROE | 10.6% | 11.5% | 8.3% | 9.3% | 10.9% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.17% | 0.26% | 0.53% | 0.45% | 0.52% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.30% | 0.31% | 0.35% | 0.57% | 0.70% |
| Woori Bank CET1 Ratio | 13.0% | 12.7% | 13.2% | 13.1% | 14.5% |
| Equity/Assets | 6.45% | 6.58% | 6.71% | 6.83% | 6.33% |
| Net Interest Margin Bank + Card | 1.62% | 1.84% | 1.82% | 1.70% | 1.72% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025Woori FG was for some years the weakest of Korea’s Big 4 Financial Groups. Operating performance had shown an improvement for a few years but disappointed in FY23. FY24 results were peer-leading, mainly supported by non-interest income, but 9M25 results lagged again (excl. purchase gains). The group has been seeking opportunities to expand its non-bank businesses. Its new securities entity launched in Aug-24 and the acquisition of two insurance companies were completed in Jul-25. Both the group and the bank CET1 ratios are behind peers, but a strong improvement from earlier. The bank LCR is low at ~107% and NSFR is acceptable at ~112%. We have a M/P recommendation based on senior ’29 trading levels. As a systemically important bank, government support is assured.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 24, 2017
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Fundamental View
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Shinhan FG was the best-managed of the large Korean financial groups over many years. During the Asian Financial Crisis, it took advantage of the opportunity to acquire competitors and other businesses, increasing its scale and expanding its business lines.
Its performance has been more variable in the past few years. After a bumpy 2020, it had a better FY21 and FY22, thanks to rising interest rates. However, operating performance turned weak again in FY23, and its FY24 profit growth was softer than peers, impacted by non-bank performance. 9M25 witnessed some improvement.
In addition to owning a Big 4 bank in Korea, Shinhan FG also has a diversified non-banking business portfolio, including a leading credit card company and a top 10 securities firm.
Business Description
AS OF 05 Nov 2025- Shinhan Financial Group (Shinhan FG) is one of Korea's most diversified financial groups and the holding company of the second largest Korean bank - Shinhan Bank. It also has credit cards, securities, asset management and insurance subsidiaries.
- Shinhan Bank was set up in 1982 with seed capital from Korean residents in Japan. It was more professionally managed than the heavily politicised older banks and came through the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in relatively good shape, taking the opportunity to acquire the larger and much longer-established Chohung Bank in 2003.
- In 2007, it made another timely acquisition, buying LG Card from its creditors after it failed during the 2003 Korean consumer lending crisis. Shinhan Card is the largest card issuer in Korea.
- Shinhan is also looking for overseas opportunities where growth is strong and Korean businesses have a presence, with a focus on Vietnam (where Shinhan Card also bought a consumer finance business in 2019) and Indonesia.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 05 Nov 2025As one of Korea’s “Big Four” financial groups, we believe Shinhan FG would likely receive governmental support if needed.
Asset quality pressure has been rising from domestic real estate project financing at non-bank subsidiaries, with credit costs rising from very low levels.
Loan growth is expected to be more challenging given tighter regulation on mortgage lending like its peers.
Profit growth may encounter challenges if there is volatility in the KRW, which could lead to significant FX losses.
Key Metric
AS OF 05 Nov 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.11% | 1.10% | 1.23% | 1.19% | 1.30% |
| ROA | 0.66% | 0.72% | 0.66% | 0.63% | 0.80% |
| ROE | 9.2% | 10.0% | 8.6% | 8.4% | 11.1% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.28% | 0.34% | 0.57% | 0.51% | 0.41% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.39% | 0.41% | 0.56% | 0.71% | 0.76% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.10% | 12.79% | 13.17% | 13.02% | 13.56% |
| Equity/Assets | 7.3% | 7.6% | 7.8% | 7.6% | 7.4% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.81% | 1.96% | 1.97% | 1.93% | 1.90% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025Shinhan FG is one of the four nation-wide commercial banking groups in Korea, with a leading credit card arm. As a systemically important bank, government support is assured. It had over many years the best operating track record, but lost its way and KB and Hana caught up; its performance was inconsistent for a few years but has improved recently. Its 9M25 returns remained high and just behind KBFG. Its CET 1 ratio was also slightly behind KBFG but leading the other two peers. The bank LCR is low at ~105% and NSFR is acceptable at ~111%. It NPL coverage ratio has declined but still decent at 124%, and it plans to lower the CET 1 ratio to slightly above 13%. We are downgrading it to U/P on tight valuations.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: October 31, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Hana Financial Group (Hana FG) struggled for several years to make its acquisition of the former Korea Exchange Bank a success, but results improved dramatically in 2015 as revenues grew and cost efficiencies improved. It has produced strong results since 2020.
The group is looking for inorganic growth in its non-bank businesses as it has fallen behind Shinhan FG and KBFG in this area, but has so far shied away from a large acquisition.
Hana Bank has the highest CET 1 ratio among the Korean Big 4 banks.
Business Description
AS OF 05 Nov 2025- Hana FG is the third-largest financial group in South Korea. From small origins as a finance company in the 1970s, after the 1997 Asian crisis, Hana grew by acquiring three other banks, including the much older Seoul Bank, which had a banking and trust management business.
- Hana FG bought Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) from Lone Star in 2012 after overcoming many hurdles, but due to staff union opposition, it could not merge with Hana Bank until 2015.
- Hana FG's overseas business is smaller than its peers, and is complemented by KEB's extensive international operations. KEB was started in 1967 as a government-owned bank specializing in foreign exchange. It had a leading share in FX transactions and trade finance among Korean banks.
- Hana FG has shown good growth in its credit card and securities non-bank businesses, but is less diversified than its larger peers KB and Shinhan, which have also acquired insurance companies. Its latest acquisition (in 2019) was a 15% stake in Vietnam's state-owned Bank for Investment & Development (BIDV). In 2023, Hana FG decided not to proceed with the acquisition of KDB Life Insurance after two months of due diligence.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Hana FG’s credit costs at ~30 bp in FY24 and 9M25 were lower than peers (in the range of 46-52 bp). However, the group’s NPL coverage ratio was also ~20-30 ppt behind peers.
NIMs are lower than those of KB and Shinhan at both the group and bank levels. The profit contribution from non-bank entities to group profits is also lagging behind these two peers. Both metrics are comparable to Woori’s.
Non-banking businesses have underperformed in recent years, with profit contributions falling from 20–30% in 2019–2021 to around 10%, primarily due to elevated provisions for domestic real estate project financing and valuation losses related to overseas commercial real estate.
Loan growth is expected to be more challenging given tighter regulation on mortgage lending.
Key Metric
AS OF 05 Nov 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.07% | 1.10% | 1.11% | 1.00% | 1.11% |
| ROA | 0.74% | 0.66% | 0.59% | 0.61% | 0.72% |
| ROE | 10.9% | 10.1% | 9.0% | 9.1% | 10.6% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.16% | 0.34% | 0.46% | 0.32% | 0.29% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.32% | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.62% | 0.73% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.8% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 13.3% |
| Equity/Assets | 6.8% | 6.4% | 6.6% | 6.7% | 6.7% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.66% | 1.83% | 1.82% | 1.69% | 1.72% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025Hana FG grew through acquisitions but only in 2015 was it able to merge its two main bank units to form KEB-Hana Bank. Hana’s management has a good record but for some years struggled to extract value from its acquisitions. Its performance for the past few years has generally been strong. More focus has been put on RWA management and capital enhancement since 2H24. There is potential for further improvements in the non-bank segment. Hana’s credit costs were lower than those of its peers, but this has also resulted in the lowest NPL coverage ratio at ~105% among the four FGs. The bank LCR and NSFR are low at 106-107%. The group aims to maintain a CET1 ratio of 13-13.5%. We are downgrading it to U/P on tight valuations.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: October 31, 2025
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Commonwealth Bank of Australia
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: Australia
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Fundamental View
AS OF 21 Oct 2025CBA has a very strong franchise in Australia; it is the leader in the retail market and is making good progress in challenging NAB in business banking.
It has been the best managed of the Australian banks for many years, and has outperformed peers. It lost some of its luster in the latter part of the 2010s due to regulatory and compliance lapses amid charges of complacency, but has since improved into a better institution.
Its capital and liquidity position is robust, and asset quality is strong.
Business Description
AS OF 21 Oct 2025- Originally established by the Australian government in 1911, CBA functioned for some time as Australia's central bank until the establishment of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1959. It remained under government ownership until the early 1990s, after which it underwent a transformation from a bureaucratic public sector bank into a widely respected commercial organisation.
- Over the past couple of decades, CBA consolidated its position as the leading bank in Australia with a 24-28% share in household deposits and lending, helped by its acquisition of Bank of Western Australia during the 2008 crisis.
- In New Zealand it owns ASB Bank, but otherwise has been selling non-core assets, including its life insurance business.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 21 Oct 2025CBA’s financial health is closely linked to the Australian economy, in particular retail credit quality, mainly housing loans. Household confidence is improving, but they continue to be stretched; discretionary consumer spend is improving though on growth in real disposable incomes. Unemployment continues to be comfortable.
Earnings/NIMs are under pressure from strong mortgage market and deposit competition. Business banking growth however has been stellar and highly profitable.
The interest rate cuts coming through from the RBA will improve borrowers’ ability to make interest payments.
Key Metric
AS OF 21 Oct 2025| AUD mn | Y22 | Y23 | Y24 | Y25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Equity | 12.7% | 14.0% | 13.6% | 13.5% |
| Total Revenues Margin | 2.1% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| Cost/Income | 46.3% | 43.7% | 45.0% | 45.7% |
| APRA CET1 Ratio | 11.5% | 12.2% | 12.3% | 12.3% |
| International CET1 Ratio | 18.6% | 19.1% | 19.1% | 20.9% |
| APRA Leverage Ratio | 5.2% | 5.1% | 5.0% | 4.7% |
| Impairment Charge/Avg Loans | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Gross Impaired Loans/Total Loans | n/m | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.1% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 130% | 131% | 136% | 130% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 130% | 124% | 116% | 115% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 11 Nov 2025CBA operates as a well-oiled machine in the Australian banking market. It has the leading position in mortgages and deposits, and is challenging NAB in business banking. An AUSTRAC penalty in 2018 damaged its reputation and remediation costs impacted earnings for a couple of years. The bank sold a number of its non-bank business and equity investments to simplify and focus on its core domestic businesses. It has the highest NIM amongst the Aussie banks. Business banking growth has been stellar and highly profitable. Asset quality is comfortable. Its seniors trade marginally tight but at an acceptable level, while its Tier 2s trade fair.
Recommendation Reviewed: November 11, 2025
Recommendation Changed: October 05, 2016
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Fundamental View
AS OF 17 Sep 2025ING displays robust and consistent asset quality, good earnings and a well-balanced funding profile although we expect financial metrics to soften from these peaks.
These attributes are supported by its strong franchise in retail and wholesale banking in the Benelux region and its good geographic diversification.
At the same time, it has sizeable exposures to cyclical industry sectors in its Wholesale Banking division, although these have been reduced in recent years. Capital cushions are being run down over time closing the gap between the bank’s capital position and those of some of its major European peers.
Business Description
AS OF 17 Sep 2025- ING was founded in 1991 by a merger between Nationale-Nederlanden and NMB Postbank Group. It is now the largest Dutch bank by total assets.
- ING is focused on retail and commercial banking in the Benelux countries, with direct banking franchises in Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia, as well as Poland, Romania, Turkey and the Philippines.
- In April 2016, it completed the process of divesting all of its insurance business (in Europe, the US and Asia), under the Restructuring Plan conditions imposed by the European Commission after it received state aid in 2008-2009.
- In November 2016, ING announced that its resolution entity would be its holding company, ING Groep NV. ING Groep is now the issuing entity for all TLAC/MREL-eligible debt (AT1, Tier 2 and senior unsecured), and its sole operating entity is ING Bank N.V.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 17 Sep 2025Recently, Moody’s amended the outlook on ING’s senior unsecured debt rating to Positive.
ING is looking to become more acquisitive, so it remains a candidate for M&A in the coming years. In 1H25, it increased its stake in Van Lanschot to 20.3%.
ING’s CET1 ratio will trend down towards its 12.5% target in the coming years, bringing it more in line with other major peers.
Key Metric
AS OF 17 Sep 2025| € mn | Y21 | Y22 | Y23 | Y24 | 2Q25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return On Equity | 8.8% | 7.1% | 14.4% | 12.6% | 13.3% |
| Total Revenues Margin | 2.0% | 1.9% | 2.3% | 2.3% | 2.1% |
| Cost/Income | 60.5% | 60.3% | 51.2% | 53.6% | 53.2% |
| CET1 Ratio (Transitional) | 15.9% | 14.5% | 14.7% | 13.6% | 13.3% |
| CET1 Ratio (Fully-Loaded) | 15.9% | 14.5% | 14.7% | 13.6% | 13.3% |
| Leverage Ratio (Fully-Loaded) | 5.9% | 5.1% | 5.0% | 4.7% | 4.3% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 139.0% | 134.0% | 143.0% | 143.0% | 141.0% |
| Impaired Loans (Gross)/Total Loans | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.8% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025After divesting its insurance operations, the remaining business, ING Bank, has stayed a solid Benelux-based bank with a strong direct banking arm in several countries. Profitability growth has been supported by a gradual recovery in the Dutch economy. Net interest revenues are declining but fundamentally, the bank looks in good shape versus several other core European banks and fee income is increasing. Capital ratios are trending downwards given distributions on offer to shareholders. In January 2025, it announced its intention to exit Russia but in September it was announced the deal has stalled. We moved from Outperform to Market perform on 6 February 2025.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: February 07, 2025
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.China CITIC Financial Asset Management (Huarong)
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: China
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Fundamental View
AS OF 10 Sep 2025A large impairment loss in FY20 brought CITIC AMC (formerly Huarong) to the brink of insolvency, but a state-led rescue plan provided it with liquidity support and brought its capital back above minimum requirements. CITIC has replaced the MoF as its largest shareholder. CITIC AMC remains as one of the Big 5 state-owned AMCs in China and will continue to perform national services.
On the guidance of the authorities, CITIC AMC has divested almost all of its non-core subsidiaries.
We expect its core operations to remain weak and volatile, until China’s economy is back on the upswing, residents regain confidence in the property market, and improved capital markets lead to better valuations on its securities books.
Business Description
AS OF 10 Sep 2025- China CITIC Financial Asset Management (formerly Huarong) is one of the five major state-owned asset management companies in China. It was first set up in 1999 to take over the bad debts of ICBC.
- The AMCs were originally due to be wound up after dealing with these "policy loans" that had come onto the books of the banks under government direction before their commercialisation, but the AMCs found a new role as commercial bad debt managers.
- CITIC AMC was commercialised in 2012 and completed its IPO on the HK stock exchange in 2015. Since then, it expanded its financial services to banking, financial leasing, securities & futures, trust, as well as consumer finance. However, after heavy losses in FY20, the company has divested almost all of its non-core business as directed by the authorities.
- Following the CITIC-led rescue plan and the equity transfer from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to CITIC, CITIC has become its largest shareholder (26.46%). Other significant shareholders include MOF (24.76%), Zhongbaorongxin (18.08%), Cinda AMC (4.89%), China Life Insurance (4.50%), National Social Security Fund (3.08%), Warburg Pincus (2.57%), and ICBC Financial AM (2.44%). It was renamed to share the "CITIC" brand in Nov-23.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 10 Sep 2025CITIC’s support is strong (name change, investment in CEB and CITIC Ltd, subsidiary disposal, new management team, etc.) and more meaningful to the company compared to direct ownership by the government.
Derisking continues with lower property exposure, non-core businesses have largely been disposed of and the company is able to focus on its main DDA business per the guidance of the authorities.
While the company was able to deliver profit growth on the back of CITIC support and its associate interest holdings, core performance remains weak, and there could be continued volatility in the name.
AMCs may find it harder to dispose DDAs at good valuations amid a deceleration economic cycle. Longer holding periods will dampen return yields.
Key Metric
AS OF 10 Sep 2025| CNY mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROA | 0.10% | (2.20%) | 0.02% | 0.75% | 1.10% |
| ROE | 1.0% | (49.8%) | 3.6% | 18.4% | 21.1% |
| Total Capital Ratio | 13.0% | 15.1% | 15.1% | 15.7% | 16.0% |
| Leverage Ratio | 14.2x | 16.1x | 11.5x | 10.1x | 8.6x |
| Equity/Assets | 0.0% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.7% | 4.0% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 02 Sep 2025CITIC AMC (ex-Huarong) continued to book profits 1H25, helped by investments in three listed SOEs. Core businesses remained weak and volatile, as the company continues to lower valuations on existing DDAs acquired many years ago. Its non-DDA financial assets also have a more volatile performance than peers. CITIC’s support is strong, derisking continues with a meaningful improvement in the provision coverage ratio, non-core businesses have all been cleared, and the company is able to focus on main DDA business per the authorities’ guidance. The capital adequacy ratio has improved meaningfully to 16%, surpassing Cinda. Disclosure remains poor. We expect it to trade ~30 bp wider than CCAMCL.
Recommendation Reviewed: September 02, 2025
Recommendation Changed: July 14, 2025
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Export-Import Bank of India
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Financial Services
- Region: India
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 4.92%
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Fundamental View
AS OF 21 Aug 2025- The Export-Import Bank of India (EXIMBK) was founded in 1982. Its credit standing is built upon the key role it plays in the promotion of India’s cross border trade and investment development, as India’s official export credit agency.
- EXIMBK is 100% owned by the Government of India. Given its crucial policy role, close governmental links and quasi-sovereign status, we view it as inconceivable that the Indian government would fail to provide EXIMBK with support in a timely manner, if needed.
Business Description
AS OF 21 Aug 2025- EXIMBK presently serves as a growth engine for the internationalization efforts of Indian businesses, facilitating the import of technology and export product development, export production, export marketing, pre- and post-shipment, as well as overseas investment.
- As at FY25, EXIMBK's loan portfolio was principally made up of export finance (65%) and term loans to exporters (21%), with the remaining 14% split among the financing of overseas investment, import finance, and export facilitation. 38% come under the policy business/face GOI risk while the remaining 62% are to the commercial business.
- By geography, the bank has a primary exposure of 31% to Africa, 59% to Asia (mainly South Asia), 7% to Europe and the Americas, and the remaining to the rest of the world.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 21 Aug 2025- As a quasi-sovereign issuer with backstops from the Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), it is viewed as a proxy to the sovereign. Any downgrade to India’s sovereign rating will flow through to EXIMBK as well.
- EXIMBK’s policy role may require it to, at times, take on exposures that could lead to financial losses. This has led to poor asset quality and high impairment charges similar to the public sector commercial banks during the years leading up to the pandemic.
- Capital standing, however, is robust thanks to capital infusions from the Government of India which have been stepped up in recent years – INR 50 bn was injected in FY19, followed by infusions of INR 15 bn and INR 13 bn in FY20 and FY21 respectively. The bank received INR 7.5 bn in FY22 despite capital levels remaining strong during the year. No infusions have been made since FY23 due to the comfortable capital position.
Key Metric
AS OF 21 Aug 2025| INR mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest Margin (Annual) | 1.84% | 2.19% | 2.29% | 2.06% | 1.83% |
| ROAA | 0.19% | 0.54% | 1.04% | 1.43% | 1.58% |
| ROAE | 1.49% | 3.97% | 7.76% | 11.47% | 13.16% |
| Equity/Assets | 13.23% | 14.12% | 12.87% | 12.06% | 11.95% |
| Tier 1 Capital Ratio | 24.0% | 28.6% | 23.7% | 19.6% | 23.9% |
| Gross NPA Ratio | 6.69% | 3.56% | 4.09% | 1.94% | 1.71% |
| Provisions/Loans | 2.46% | 0.90% | 1.24% | 0.29% | (0.32%) |
| Pre-Impairment Operating Profit / Average Assets | 2.13% | 2.31% | 2.41% | 2.12% | 1.83% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 06 Jan 2025Exim Bank of India is the country’s key policy bank with full government support. It provides financial assistance to exporters and importers with a view to promote trade in India. It is 100% owned by the Government of India (GoI) and is a proxy to the India sovereign in international debt markets (quasi-sovereign status). The bank cannot be liquidated without the government’s approval and has a track record of government capital infusions. The bank’s asset quality is back on track after some wobbles in previous years. Capital levels are strong. We maintain a Market perform recommendation on the bank.
Recommendation Reviewed: January 06, 2025
Recommendation Changed: January 04, 2021
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.BMO Financial
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Consumer Finance and Banking
- Region: Canada
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Fundamental View
AS OF 13 Aug 2025BMO is geographically diversified within Canada & via its commercial banking business in the U.S. and is also well-diversified by revenue with contribution from fee income businesses.
Credit has performed worse than peers in 2024, but losses have stabilized in 2025, based on underwriting and risk management changes in recent years as well as seasoning effects.
Business Description
AS OF 13 Aug 2025- BMO Financial Group is the third largest depository institution in Canada with C$1.44 tn in assets as of F2Q25 and a market capitalization of US$77 bn. Total deposits were C$958 bn at F2Q25.
- BMO operates 1,890 branches in Canada and the United States in 2024.
- As of YE24, BMO had 1,013 branches within the United States, mostly in the Midwest. BMO ranked 11th in deposit market share in the U.S. (SNL), with a top-2 share in Illinois.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 13 Aug 2025BMO has a strong core deposit base in Canada and in the U.S., which mitigates the potential for a liquidity event. BMO remains well-capitalized relative to requirements with a target CET1 ratio of 12.5% (13.5% at F2Q25).
BMO closed the acquisition of Bank of the West from BNP Paribas in February 2023, significantly expanding its footprint in the U.S. We don’t expect deal integration to have much impact on the credit profile.
We view real estate-related risk in Canada as manageable for BMO given low LTV of exposures in vulnerable markets and conservative underwriting. Commercial real estate accounts for ~10% of total loans, and office is quite manageable at ~1% of total.
Credit trends have largely stabilized in 1H25, while provisions could incrementally increase in 2H25 in light of current macro uncertainties.
BMO’s reserves and capital levels all point to BMO maintaining a conservative balance sheet stance and having flexibility to manage through a more extended period of macro weakness in Canada.
Key Metric
AS OF 13 Aug 2025| $ mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | LTM 2Q25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 20,509 | 26,727 | 21,694 | 24,095 | 25,173 |
| Net Income | 6,167 | 10,519 | 3,291 | 5,380 | 5,935 |
| ROAE | 0.98% | 0.98% | 0.98% | 0.98% | 0.98% |
| NIM | 1.56% | 1.56% | 1.56% | 1.56% | 1.56% |
| Net Charge-offs / Loans | 0.14% | 0.08% | 0.14% | 0.39% | 0.43% |
| Total Assets | 797,018 | 860,451 | 969,851 | 1,011,587 | 1,042,299 |
| Unsecured LT Funding | 51,915 | 64,886 | 63,418 | 115,839 | 118,598 |
| CET1 Ratio (Fully-Phased-In) | 13.7% | 16.7% | 12.5% | 13.6% | 13.5% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 13 Nov 2025We maintain our Market perform for BMO, with our preference within the group remaining to trade up in quality to RBC and TD. Surprising deterioration in asset quality metrics was the story throughout the latter part of F2024, with provisions well above historical average levels. Management has attributed the weakness largely to large wholesale loans to new borrowers originated in 2021, but given the steady climb in reserve coverage as well as changes to risk management and underwriting in recent years, BMO is confident quarterly provision ratios should moderate across F2025 alongside further potential benefits from efficiency initatives. This appeared to be the case thus far with the improvement in credit performance particularly notable in F3Q25.
Recommendation Reviewed: November 13, 2025
Recommendation Changed: August 26, 2020
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Fundamental View
AS OF 25 Jul 2025IBK benefits from a legally binding solvency guarantee from the Korean government and is viewed as a Korean quasi-sovereign issuer. The bank is listed, but remains majority state-owned. Previous governments had proposed privatizing it, but subsequent governments scrapped these plans. The government intends to keep its stake above 50%, and wants IBK to focus on lending to SMEs and provide earlier stage investment capital.
IBK manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks.
Business Description
AS OF 25 Jul 2025- IBK was established under its own Act in 1961 to assist the development of Korea's small business sector. It claims a 24% market share in SME lending.
- It was listed in the early 1990s, but was re-nationalised following heavy losses in the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. It was re-listed in 2003, and is majority owned by the government which holds 59.5%; the National Pension Scheme holds 5.6%, and other policy banks have small stakes (7.2% by Korea Development Bank and 1.8% by the Export-Import Bank of Korea).
- Under Article 43 of the IBK Act, if the bank incurs losses they should be set against its reserves and "if the reserves are not sufficient the Government shall assume the remaining loss". Although this is a solvency guarantee and not an explicit guarantee for the timely payment of debts, we believe the Korean government will ensure IBK is in a position to make such timely payments.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 25 Jul 2025The bank’s ratings are closely tied to the Korean sovereign’s ratings due to its quasi-sovereign status.
Its ratings and its default risk should therefore not be impacted by any deterioration in its financials, provided the government continues to inject new capital when needed, which it is expected to.
Its policy mandate requires it to use at least 70% of its funding for SMEs. Risks are mitigated by its granular SME exposures which are more than 80% secured, including guarantee from state-owned credit guarantee agencies. Korean governments have also always been quick to provide support including capital injections to IBK when needed, with the most recent injection of KRW 1.3 tn during the COVID.
Key Metric
AS OF 25 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Operating Profit / Average Assets | 1.30% | 1.49% | 1.59% | 1.39% | 1.34% |
| ROAA | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| ROAE | 9.2% | 9.5% | 8.8% | 8.1% | 8.8% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.67% | 0.52% | 0.44% |
| Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans | 0.85% | 0.85% | 1.05% | 1.34% | 1.37% |
| CET1 Ratio | 11.3% | 11.1% | 11.3% | 11.3% | 11.7% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 6.92% | 6.79% | 7.10% | 7.25% | 7.18% |
| NIM | 1.51% | 1.78% | 1.79% | 1.70% | 1.59% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 16 Jun 2025IBK is not wholly government owned – 59.5% direct government ownership, 7.2% KDB and 1.8% KEXIM – but is a policy bank benefiting from a Korean government solvency guarantee. For a policy bank it also has a fairly good track record and manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks. As the leading lender to Korea’s medium and small businesses, IBK plays a key role in the country’s economy, enhanced by the longstanding objective of numerous administrations to achieve a more diversified economy less reliant on the “chaebol”. Successive Korean governments have always been quick to provide support including capital injections to the policy banks when needed.
Recommendation Reviewed: June 16, 2025
Recommendation Changed: March 17, 2017
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Siam Commercial Bank
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Country: Thailand
- Region: Thailand
- Bond: SCBTB 3.9 24
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 5.573% (Indicative as of March 2)
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Fundamental View
AS OF 24 Jul 2025Siam Commercial Bank (SCBTB) has been a sound and profitable bank. It has a focus on the retail segment and targets to increase margins by growing its non-traditional banking businesses. It announced a major business overhaul in September 2021 to establish a new parent company called SCB X to segregate the group’s core banking services (Gen 1) from its new fintech and digital businesses and to enable greater flexibility and independence.
Recent credit costs however have been elevated due to the riskier exposure that these entail. However, profitability remains healthy and the capital buffer is strong at both the Holdco (SCB X) and Bank (SCB) level.
Business Description
AS OF 24 Jul 2025- Siam Commercial Bank was founded as the "Book Club" in 1904. In 1907, it started operating as a commercial bank and was renamed as "The Siam Commercial Bank". It completed its IPO on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1976.
- The bank is 23.58% owned by the King of Thailand, and a further 23.32% is owned by the Vayupak Fund 1, which is controlled by the government.
- SCB is the fourth largest Thai bank by assets and is known for its robust retail franchise.
- Its loan profile was 36% corporate, 17% SME, and 47% retail as of June 2025.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 24 Jul 2025We see a meaningful impact to the Thai economy from potential US tariffs, with ripple effects in the form of lower bank NIMs (as more rate cuts come through to support growth) and higher credit costs than earlier guided for this year. Moody’s also downgraded its rating outlook on the Thailand sovereign, and consequently the Thai banks including KBANK, to negative on 29 April 2025, citing increased risks to Thailand’s economic and fiscal strength, partly due to the potential impact of new US tariffs.
The group’s business overhaul and strategic direction comes with higher credit costs from the riskier target segments at the Gen2/3 businesses given the challenged macroeconomic environment. Credit costs may rise again in 2026 there is a bad outcome on tariffs. However, SCB X’s higher NIM and low-40%s cost-income ratio should provide comfortable room for that to be absorbed. We also take comfort in the ringfencing of the bank unit (SCB) from the Group’s riskier business units, and management’s minimum CET1 ratio of 16% at SCB.
Loan growth is likely to remain modest in FY25 given a still soft growth outlook for Thailand.
Key Metric
AS OF 24 Jul 2025| THB mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPP ROA | 2.63% | 2.50% | 2.88% | 2.87% | 2.97% |
| ROA | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.4% |
| ROE | 8.4% | 8.3% | 9.3% | 9.1% | 10.4% |
| Equity/Assets | 13.4% | 13.5% | 14.1% | 14.2% | 13.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 17.6% | 17.7% | 17.6% | 17.7% | 17.8% |
| Reported NPL ratio | 3.79% | 3.34% | 3.44% | 3.37% | 3.31% |
| Provisions/Loans | 1.84% | 1.45% | 1.82% | 1.76% | 1.64% |
| Gross LDR | 93% | 93% | 99% | 97% | 97% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 202% | 216% | 217% | 212% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 23 Oct 2025SCB is the 4th largest bank in Thailand and has a leading retail franchise. Asset quality during COVID was poor. It created a new HoldCo structure (SCBX) in 2022 to shift digital units and unsecured retail loans outside the bank, and pledged a >16% CET1 ratio at SCB. The BOT has also ringfenced SCB which further reduces the risk for the SCBTB bonds. The NIM has been strong vs. peers as expected. We expect there to still be a sizable restructured book at SCB, and higher retail exposure amid elevated household debt has resulted in credit costs staying high, but these have been comfortably absorbed. We also see a meaningful impact to the Thai economy from US tariffs, with ripple effects in the form of lower bank NIMs and continued high credit costs. We have an Underperform rec.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 23, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 22, 2025
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