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Sector: Financial Services
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Fundamental View
AS OF 12 Nov 2025UOB has solid stand-alone credit profile and benefits from the high likelihood of support from the government of Singapore, where it is one of the three major local banks.
The bank is more focused on Singapore and Southeast Asia than on Greater China; its traditional strengths are the SME and retail sectors, although its large corporate book is now over 60% of loans.
UOB has been conservatively managed with a sound risk profile, a strong focus on liquidity and a long track record of relatively good performance. However, its 3Q25 results showed some softness with substantial provisions set aside for HK and US CRE.
Business Description
AS OF 12 Nov 2025- UOB was established in 1935 as a Chinese family-owned bank catering to the Hokkien (Fujian) community, Singapore's largest Chinese ethnic sub-group. The Wee family owns about 18% of the shares. A further 5.2% is held by the Lien family which previously controlled Overseas Union Bank, which UOB merged within 2001. The Wee family has significant real estate and hospitality interests in Singapore and regionally.
- UOB's main markets are Singapore and Malaysia where its presence dates back to before Singapore's independence. It expanded through acquisitions in Thailand (Bank Radanasin and Bank of Asia) and Indonesia (Bank Buana), and more recently bought over Citi's consumer franchise in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam.
- Franchise strengths are in SME and consumer lending. Building & construction accounts for 27% of loans, followed by housing at 24%, financial institutions at 11% and general commerce at 11% at 2Q25.
- Loans by geography comprise Singapore at 50% of loans, Greater China at 14%, Malaysia at 10%, Thailand at 8%, and Indonesia at 3% at 2Q25.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 12 Nov 2025UOB has a greater focus on Southeast Asia than its Singapore bank peers, which leaves it open to more asset quality risk in a downturn / high interest rate environment. It has 8% of its loan book in Thailand, where we are cautious about macroeconomic conditions.
The bank has benefited more from the final Basel III rules implementation than its peers – its CET 1 ratio was previously the lowest among the three but now aligns with peers.
It posted a large profit decline in 3Q25 which was a negative surprise. Although the improved coverage ratios following the preemptive provision recognition are welcome, its NPL coverage ratio remains 40-60 ppt behind peers, and we did not find reassurance from its credit cost outlook. Topline performance also lagged peers.
Key Metric
AS OF 12 Nov 2025| SGD mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPP ROA | 1.23% | 1.31% | 1.52% | 1.51% | 1.44% |
| ROA | 0.92% | 0.99% | 1.19% | 1.19% | 0.81% |
| ROE | 10.2% | 11.9% | 14.2% | 13.7% | 9.0% |
| Equity to Assets | 9.3% | 8.6% | 8.8% | 9.2% | 8.9% |
| CET1 Ratio (fully-loaded) | 13.5% | 13.3% | 13.4% | 15.4% | 14.5% |
| NPL Ratio | 1.62% | 1.58% | 1.52% | 1.53% | 1.60% |
| Provisions / Loans | 0.20% | 0.20% | 0.25% | 0.27% | 0.68% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 133% | 147% | 158% | 143% | 142% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 116% | 116% | 120% | 116% | 116% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 07 Nov 2025UOB is conservatively run with a large family ownership and a sound balance sheet. The bank is more focused on SG and Southeast Asia than on Greater China. Outside SG, its main operations in ASEAN are in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia which collectively make up ~20% of its loan book. It acquired Citi’s consumer operations in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, which has been good for the franchise. The bank has benefitted more from the final Basel III rules implementation than its peers but it has lost this advantage again since 3Q25. The substantial preemptive provisions taken in 3Q25 to strengthen coverage ratios heavily hit the bank’s 3Q25 results, but UOB’s NPL coverage ratio remained 40-60 ppt behind the two peers. New NPAs have risen due to its CRE exposure in HK and the US.
Recommendation Reviewed: November 07, 2025
Recommendation Changed: July 04, 2017
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Fundamental View
AS OF 07 Nov 2025BDO Unibank (BDO) is the largest bank in the Philippines in terms of assets & market share.
Given its size and systemic importance, BDO is considered too big to fail and is strongly likely to be supported by its controlling shareholder SM Investments, as well as the Philippine government in times of stress.
BDO is widely viewed as the soundest bank in the country given its strong fundamentals, well-diversified businesses, and good management.
Business Description
AS OF 07 Nov 2025- BDO Unibank was established as Acme Savings Bank in 1968, and was then acquired by SM Investments in 1976. It became a commercial bank in 1994 and a universal bank in 1996.
- BDO was listed in May 2002. SM Investments remains the bank's largest shareholder with a 41% stake.
- BDO has expanded through a series of M&As. Among its key transactions, it merged with Dao Heng Bank Philippines in 2001, Banco Santander Philippines in 2003, UOB Philippines in 2005, Equitable PCI Bank in 2007, GE Money Bank in 2009, Citibank Savings, DB Trust and Real Bank in 2014, One Network Bank in 2015 (the largest rural bank in the Philippines), and RB Pandi's banking business in 2019. It also acquired the insurance business of Generali in the Philippines in 2016.
- BDO has the largest distribution network in the country and is ranked the largest bank in terms of consolidated resources, total assets, loans, deposits and trust funds under management.
- Its loan book was split 51% large corporates, 24% middle market, and 25% consumer at 2Q25. 41% of the consumer book comprised mortgages, 29% credit cards, 13% auto loans and the remaining personal loans (13%) and others (5%).
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 07 Nov 2025Direct impact from US tariffs is limited given that the Philippines is not a major goods exporter, but there is likely to be some second order effects from a slowdown in regional and global growth.
We anticipate a negative impact to loan and GDP growth from the recent public infrastructure spending corruption scandal, which will slow government spending and private investments for the next couple of quarters. Further BSP rate cuts are likely in order to support growth, which will put downward pressure on the NIM.
We see few asset quality risks for BDO given a comfortable NPL cover (3Q25: 134%) and build up of the CET1 ratio (3Q25: 14.4%), as well as BDO’s large corporates book (~50% of total loans) and underwriting track record.
Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign would negatively impact BDO.
Key Metric
AS OF 07 Nov 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NIM | 4.05% | 4.14% | 4.37% | 4.35% | 4.29% |
| Reported ROA (Cumulative) | 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.7% |
| Reported ROE (Cumulative) | 10.4% | 13.0% | 15.2% | 15.1% | 14.1% |
| Equity/Assets | 11.7% | 11.3% | 11.5% | 11.8% | 11.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.6% | 13.4% | 13.8% | 14.1% | 14.4% |
| NPL ratio | 2.8% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.8% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.72% | 0.64% | 0.59% | 0.46% | 0.44% |
| PPP ROA | 2.1% | 2.3% | 2.7% | 2.5% | 2.4% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 145% | 141% | 123% | 132% | 143% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 124% | 124% | 124% | 122% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 07 Jan 2026BDO is the largest bank in the Philippines. Management is well-regarded, the business is well-diversified and it is the market leader in many business lines. The NIM has peaked with the turn in policy rates, but non-interest income is close to a third of operating income given good fee generation and overall core profitability is strong. We remain comfortable with BDO given the large corporate book and comfortable NPL cover, as well as underwriting track record, which provide comfort around the recently robust growth in retail loans. Capital has also been steadily built up with the CET1 ratio at 14.4% at 3Q25. However, we have BDO on Underperform from an RV standpoint.
Recommendation Reviewed: January 07, 2026
Recommendation Changed: January 07, 2026
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Woori Financial Group
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Country: Korea
- Bond: WOORIB 4.875 28
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 5.108% (Indicative as of March 2)
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Fundamental View
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Woori FG’s performance record had been less consistent than some of its more commercially focused peers but improved in FY21-22. Its FY23 performance lagged behind its peers, but FY24 profit growth was peer-leading, partially thanks to not having the ELS compensation issue which hit the other three FGs in 1Q24. 9M25 performance was softer again due to several one-offs.
Asset quality used to be a strength with the lowest NPL ratios and credit costs among the four FGs but has deteriorated since 2Q23, and we no longer see a gap with the other FGs.
Capital standing is a relative weakness but is closer than ever before to that of its peers on the back of active portfolio management.
Business Description
AS OF 05 Nov 2025- Woori's predecessor banks were rescued by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
- Woori Bank is one of Korea's 'Big Four' commercial banks. It previously owned two regional banks, Kwangju and Kyongnam, but these were spun off in 2014. Woori also sold its stake in Woori Investment Securities and its savings bank and life insurance arms to NH Financial Group.
- Woori set up a HoldCo (Woori FG) in January 2019 to expand into more diversified business lines, particularly investment banking. It used to have a HoldCo, but it was dissolved in 2014 when it was merged with Woori Bank.
- Its main subsidiaries are 100%-owned Woori Card, Woori Financial Capital (auto leasing), Woori Investment Bank and 72.3%-owned Woori Asset Trust. In August 2024, the group relaunched securities business by acquiring Korea Foss Securities and merging it with Woori Investment. The group also acquired a 75.34% stake in Tongyang Life and full ownership of ABL Life and has consolidated them since 1 July 2025.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Woori FG was for many years majority-owned by the Korean government via the Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), but KDIC has steadily sold down its shareholding, and Woori purchased and cancelled the remaining shares in 2024. That said, Woori FG remains a large, systemically important bank with strong potential government backing if needed.
Woori FG is less diversified than KB and Shinhan, with most of its earnings coming from the bank and small contributions from the card and leasing businesses. The group has accelerated its M&A pace since 2024; it relaunched securities business and acquired two insurance companies. However, It will likely take more time than expected for the new non-banking segments to make a meaningful contribution to the group.
Loan growth is expected to be more challenging given tighter regulation on mortgage lending.
Key Metric
AS OF 05 Nov 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 0.99% | 1.15% | 1.10% | 1.17% | 1.07% |
| ROA | 0.66% | 0.70% | 0.54% | 0.61% | 0.71% |
| ROE | 10.6% | 11.5% | 8.3% | 9.3% | 10.9% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.17% | 0.26% | 0.53% | 0.45% | 0.52% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.30% | 0.31% | 0.35% | 0.57% | 0.70% |
| Woori Bank CET1 Ratio | 13.0% | 12.7% | 13.2% | 13.1% | 14.5% |
| Equity/Assets | 6.45% | 6.58% | 6.71% | 6.83% | 6.33% |
| Net Interest Margin Bank + Card | 1.62% | 1.84% | 1.82% | 1.70% | 1.72% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025Woori FG was for some years the weakest of Korea’s Big 4 Financial Groups. Operating performance had shown an improvement for a few years but disappointed in FY23. FY24 results were peer-leading, mainly supported by non-interest income, but 9M25 results lagged again (excl. purchase gains). The group has been seeking opportunities to expand its non-bank businesses. Its new securities entity launched in Aug-24 and the acquisition of two insurance companies were completed in Jul-25. Both the group and the bank CET1 ratios are behind peers, but a strong improvement from earlier. The bank LCR is low at ~107% and NSFR is acceptable at ~112%. We have a M/P recommendation based on senior ’29 trading levels. As a systemically important bank, government support is assured.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 24, 2017
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Fundamental View
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Shinhan FG was the best-managed of the large Korean financial groups over many years. During the Asian Financial Crisis, it took advantage of the opportunity to acquire competitors and other businesses, increasing its scale and expanding its business lines.
Its performance has been more variable in the past few years. After a bumpy 2020, it had a better FY21 and FY22, thanks to rising interest rates. However, operating performance turned weak again in FY23, and its FY24 profit growth was softer than peers, impacted by non-bank performance. 9M25 witnessed some improvement.
In addition to owning a Big 4 bank in Korea, Shinhan FG also has a diversified non-banking business portfolio, including a leading credit card company and a top 10 securities firm.
Business Description
AS OF 05 Nov 2025- Shinhan Financial Group (Shinhan FG) is one of Korea's most diversified financial groups and the holding company of the second largest Korean bank - Shinhan Bank. It also has credit cards, securities, asset management and insurance subsidiaries.
- Shinhan Bank was set up in 1982 with seed capital from Korean residents in Japan. It was more professionally managed than the heavily politicised older banks and came through the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in relatively good shape, taking the opportunity to acquire the larger and much longer-established Chohung Bank in 2003.
- In 2007, it made another timely acquisition, buying LG Card from its creditors after it failed during the 2003 Korean consumer lending crisis. Shinhan Card is the largest card issuer in Korea.
- Shinhan is also looking for overseas opportunities where growth is strong and Korean businesses have a presence, with a focus on Vietnam (where Shinhan Card also bought a consumer finance business in 2019) and Indonesia.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 05 Nov 2025As one of Korea’s “Big Four” financial groups, we believe Shinhan FG would likely receive governmental support if needed.
Asset quality pressure has been rising from domestic real estate project financing at non-bank subsidiaries, with credit costs rising from very low levels.
Loan growth is expected to be more challenging given tighter regulation on mortgage lending like its peers.
Profit growth may encounter challenges if there is volatility in the KRW, which could lead to significant FX losses.
Key Metric
AS OF 05 Nov 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.11% | 1.10% | 1.23% | 1.19% | 1.30% |
| ROA | 0.66% | 0.72% | 0.66% | 0.63% | 0.80% |
| ROE | 9.2% | 10.0% | 8.6% | 8.4% | 11.1% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.28% | 0.34% | 0.57% | 0.51% | 0.41% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.39% | 0.41% | 0.56% | 0.71% | 0.76% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.10% | 12.79% | 13.17% | 13.02% | 13.56% |
| Equity/Assets | 7.3% | 7.6% | 7.8% | 7.6% | 7.4% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.81% | 1.96% | 1.97% | 1.93% | 1.90% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025Shinhan FG is one of the four nation-wide commercial banking groups in Korea, with a leading credit card arm. As a systemically important bank, government support is assured. It had over many years the best operating track record, but lost its way and KB and Hana caught up; its performance was inconsistent for a few years but has improved recently. Its 9M25 returns remained high and just behind KBFG. Its CET 1 ratio was also slightly behind KBFG but leading the other two peers. The bank LCR is low at ~105% and NSFR is acceptable at ~111%. It NPL coverage ratio has declined but still decent at 124%, and it plans to lower the CET 1 ratio to slightly above 13%. We are downgrading it to U/P on tight valuations.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: October 31, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Hana Financial Group (Hana FG) struggled for several years to make its acquisition of the former Korea Exchange Bank a success, but results improved dramatically in 2015 as revenues grew and cost efficiencies improved. It has produced strong results since 2020.
The group is looking for inorganic growth in its non-bank businesses as it has fallen behind Shinhan FG and KBFG in this area, but has so far shied away from a large acquisition.
Hana Bank has the highest CET 1 ratio among the Korean Big 4 banks.
Business Description
AS OF 05 Nov 2025- Hana FG is the third-largest financial group in South Korea. From small origins as a finance company in the 1970s, after the 1997 Asian crisis, Hana grew by acquiring three other banks, including the much older Seoul Bank, which had a banking and trust management business.
- Hana FG bought Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) from Lone Star in 2012 after overcoming many hurdles, but due to staff union opposition, it could not merge with Hana Bank until 2015.
- Hana FG's overseas business is smaller than its peers, and is complemented by KEB's extensive international operations. KEB was started in 1967 as a government-owned bank specializing in foreign exchange. It had a leading share in FX transactions and trade finance among Korean banks.
- Hana FG has shown good growth in its credit card and securities non-bank businesses, but is less diversified than its larger peers KB and Shinhan, which have also acquired insurance companies. Its latest acquisition (in 2019) was a 15% stake in Vietnam's state-owned Bank for Investment & Development (BIDV). In 2023, Hana FG decided not to proceed with the acquisition of KDB Life Insurance after two months of due diligence.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 05 Nov 2025Hana FG’s credit costs at ~30 bp in FY24 and 9M25 were lower than peers (in the range of 46-52 bp). However, the group’s NPL coverage ratio was also ~20-30 ppt behind peers.
NIMs are lower than those of KB and Shinhan at both the group and bank levels. The profit contribution from non-bank entities to group profits is also lagging behind these two peers. Both metrics are comparable to Woori’s.
Non-banking businesses have underperformed in recent years, with profit contributions falling from 20–30% in 2019–2021 to around 10%, primarily due to elevated provisions for domestic real estate project financing and valuation losses related to overseas commercial real estate.
Loan growth is expected to be more challenging given tighter regulation on mortgage lending.
Key Metric
AS OF 05 Nov 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 9M25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.07% | 1.10% | 1.11% | 1.00% | 1.11% |
| ROA | 0.74% | 0.66% | 0.59% | 0.61% | 0.72% |
| ROE | 10.9% | 10.1% | 9.0% | 9.1% | 10.6% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.16% | 0.34% | 0.46% | 0.32% | 0.29% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.32% | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.62% | 0.73% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.8% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 13.3% |
| Equity/Assets | 6.8% | 6.4% | 6.6% | 6.7% | 6.7% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.66% | 1.83% | 1.82% | 1.69% | 1.72% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 31 Oct 2025Hana FG grew through acquisitions but only in 2015 was it able to merge its two main bank units to form KEB-Hana Bank. Hana’s management has a good record but for some years struggled to extract value from its acquisitions. Its performance for the past few years has generally been strong. More focus has been put on RWA management and capital enhancement since 2H24. There is potential for further improvements in the non-bank segment. Hana’s credit costs were lower than those of its peers, but this has also resulted in the lowest NPL coverage ratio at ~105% among the four FGs. The bank LCR and NSFR are low at 106-107%. The group aims to maintain a CET1 ratio of 13-13.5%. We are downgrading it to U/P on tight valuations.
Recommendation Reviewed: October 31, 2025
Recommendation Changed: October 31, 2025
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Commonwealth Bank of Australia
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: Australia
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Fundamental View
AS OF 21 Oct 2025CBA has a very strong franchise in Australia; it is the leader in the retail market and is making good progress in challenging NAB in business banking.
It has been the best managed of the Australian banks for many years, and has outperformed peers. It lost some of its luster in the latter part of the 2010s due to regulatory and compliance lapses amid charges of complacency, but has since improved into a better institution.
Its capital and liquidity position is robust, and asset quality is strong.
Business Description
AS OF 21 Oct 2025- Originally established by the Australian government in 1911, CBA functioned for some time as Australia's central bank until the establishment of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1959. It remained under government ownership until the early 1990s, after which it underwent a transformation from a bureaucratic public sector bank into a widely respected commercial organisation.
- Over the past couple of decades, CBA consolidated its position as the leading bank in Australia with a 24-28% share in household deposits and lending, helped by its acquisition of Bank of Western Australia during the 2008 crisis.
- In New Zealand it owns ASB Bank, but otherwise has been selling non-core assets, including its life insurance business.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 21 Oct 2025CBA’s financial health is closely linked to the Australian economy, in particular retail credit quality, mainly housing loans. Household confidence is improving, but they continue to be stretched; discretionary consumer spend is improving though on growth in real disposable incomes. Unemployment continues to be comfortable.
Earnings/NIMs are under pressure from strong mortgage market and deposit competition. Business banking growth however has been stellar and highly profitable.
The interest rate cuts coming through from the RBA will improve borrowers’ ability to make interest payments.
Key Metric
AS OF 21 Oct 2025| AUD mn | Y22 | Y23 | Y24 | Y25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Equity | 12.7% | 14.0% | 13.6% | 13.5% |
| Total Revenues Margin | 2.1% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| Cost/Income | 46.3% | 43.7% | 45.0% | 45.7% |
| APRA CET1 Ratio | 11.5% | 12.2% | 12.3% | 12.3% |
| International CET1 Ratio | 18.6% | 19.1% | 19.1% | 20.9% |
| APRA Leverage Ratio | 5.2% | 5.1% | 5.0% | 4.7% |
| Impairment Charge/Avg Loans | (0.0%) | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Gross Impaired Loans/Total Loans | n/m | 0.8% | 1.0% | 1.1% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 130% | 131% | 136% | 130% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 130% | 124% | 116% | 115% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 11 Nov 2025CBA operates as a well-oiled machine in the Australian banking market. It has the leading position in mortgages and deposits, and is challenging NAB in business banking. An AUSTRAC penalty in 2018 damaged its reputation and remediation costs impacted earnings for a couple of years. The bank sold a number of its non-bank business and equity investments to simplify and focus on its core domestic businesses. It has the highest NIM amongst the Aussie banks. Business banking growth has been stellar and highly profitable. Asset quality is comfortable. Its seniors trade marginally tight but at an acceptable level, while its Tier 2s trade fair.
Recommendation Reviewed: November 11, 2025
Recommendation Changed: October 05, 2016
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.China CITIC Financial Asset Management (Huarong)
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: China
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Fundamental View
AS OF 10 Sep 2025A large impairment loss in FY20 brought CITIC AMC (formerly Huarong) to the brink of insolvency, but a state-led rescue plan provided it with liquidity support and brought its capital back above minimum requirements. CITIC has replaced the MoF as its largest shareholder. CITIC AMC remains as one of the Big 5 state-owned AMCs in China and will continue to perform national services.
On the guidance of the authorities, CITIC AMC has divested almost all of its non-core subsidiaries.
We expect its core operations to remain weak and volatile, until China’s economy is back on the upswing, residents regain confidence in the property market, and improved capital markets lead to better valuations on its securities books.
Business Description
AS OF 10 Sep 2025- China CITIC Financial Asset Management (formerly Huarong) is one of the five major state-owned asset management companies in China. It was first set up in 1999 to take over the bad debts of ICBC.
- The AMCs were originally due to be wound up after dealing with these "policy loans" that had come onto the books of the banks under government direction before their commercialisation, but the AMCs found a new role as commercial bad debt managers.
- CITIC AMC was commercialised in 2012 and completed its IPO on the HK stock exchange in 2015. Since then, it expanded its financial services to banking, financial leasing, securities & futures, trust, as well as consumer finance. However, after heavy losses in FY20, the company has divested almost all of its non-core business as directed by the authorities.
- Following the CITIC-led rescue plan and the equity transfer from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to CITIC, CITIC has become its largest shareholder (26.46%). Other significant shareholders include MOF (24.76%), Zhongbaorongxin (18.08%), Cinda AMC (4.89%), China Life Insurance (4.50%), National Social Security Fund (3.08%), Warburg Pincus (2.57%), and ICBC Financial AM (2.44%). It was renamed to share the "CITIC" brand in Nov-23.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 10 Sep 2025CITIC’s support is strong (name change, investment in CEB and CITIC Ltd, subsidiary disposal, new management team, etc.) and more meaningful to the company compared to direct ownership by the government.
Derisking continues with lower property exposure, non-core businesses have largely been disposed of and the company is able to focus on its main DDA business per the guidance of the authorities.
While the company was able to deliver profit growth on the back of CITIC support and its associate interest holdings, core performance remains weak, and there could be continued volatility in the name.
AMCs may find it harder to dispose DDAs at good valuations amid a deceleration economic cycle. Longer holding periods will dampen return yields.
Key Metric
AS OF 10 Sep 2025| CNY mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROA | 0.10% | (2.20%) | 0.02% | 0.75% | 1.10% |
| ROE | 1.0% | (49.8%) | 3.6% | 18.4% | 21.1% |
| Total Capital Ratio | 13.0% | 15.1% | 15.1% | 15.7% | 16.0% |
| Leverage Ratio | 14.2x | 16.1x | 11.5x | 10.1x | 8.6x |
| Equity/Assets | 0.0% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.7% | 4.0% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 02 Sep 2025CITIC AMC (ex-Huarong) continued to book profits 1H25, helped by investments in three listed SOEs. Core businesses remained weak and volatile, as the company continues to lower valuations on existing DDAs acquired many years ago. Its non-DDA financial assets also have a more volatile performance than peers. CITIC’s support is strong, derisking continues with a meaningful improvement in the provision coverage ratio, non-core businesses have all been cleared, and the company is able to focus on main DDA business per the authorities’ guidance. The capital adequacy ratio has improved meaningfully to 16%, surpassing Cinda. Disclosure remains poor. We expect it to trade ~30 bp wider than CCAMCL.
Recommendation Reviewed: September 02, 2025
Recommendation Changed: July 14, 2025
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Fundamental View
AS OF 25 Jul 2025IBK benefits from a legally binding solvency guarantee from the Korean government and is viewed as a Korean quasi-sovereign issuer. The bank is listed, but remains majority state-owned. Previous governments had proposed privatizing it, but subsequent governments scrapped these plans. The government intends to keep its stake above 50%, and wants IBK to focus on lending to SMEs and provide earlier stage investment capital.
IBK manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks.
Business Description
AS OF 25 Jul 2025- IBK was established under its own Act in 1961 to assist the development of Korea's small business sector. It claims a 24% market share in SME lending.
- It was listed in the early 1990s, but was re-nationalised following heavy losses in the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. It was re-listed in 2003, and is majority owned by the government which holds 59.5%; the National Pension Scheme holds 5.6%, and other policy banks have small stakes (7.2% by Korea Development Bank and 1.8% by the Export-Import Bank of Korea).
- Under Article 43 of the IBK Act, if the bank incurs losses they should be set against its reserves and "if the reserves are not sufficient the Government shall assume the remaining loss". Although this is a solvency guarantee and not an explicit guarantee for the timely payment of debts, we believe the Korean government will ensure IBK is in a position to make such timely payments.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 25 Jul 2025The bank’s ratings are closely tied to the Korean sovereign’s ratings due to its quasi-sovereign status.
Its ratings and its default risk should therefore not be impacted by any deterioration in its financials, provided the government continues to inject new capital when needed, which it is expected to.
Its policy mandate requires it to use at least 70% of its funding for SMEs. Risks are mitigated by its granular SME exposures which are more than 80% secured, including guarantee from state-owned credit guarantee agencies. Korean governments have also always been quick to provide support including capital injections to IBK when needed, with the most recent injection of KRW 1.3 tn during the COVID.
Key Metric
AS OF 25 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Operating Profit / Average Assets | 1.30% | 1.49% | 1.59% | 1.39% | 1.34% |
| ROAA | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| ROAE | 9.2% | 9.5% | 8.8% | 8.1% | 8.8% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.67% | 0.52% | 0.44% |
| Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans | 0.85% | 0.85% | 1.05% | 1.34% | 1.37% |
| CET1 Ratio | 11.3% | 11.1% | 11.3% | 11.3% | 11.7% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 6.92% | 6.79% | 7.10% | 7.25% | 7.18% |
| NIM | 1.51% | 1.78% | 1.79% | 1.70% | 1.59% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 16 Jun 2025IBK is not wholly government owned – 59.5% direct government ownership, 7.2% KDB and 1.8% KEXIM – but is a policy bank benefiting from a Korean government solvency guarantee. For a policy bank it also has a fairly good track record and manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks. As the leading lender to Korea’s medium and small businesses, IBK plays a key role in the country’s economy, enhanced by the longstanding objective of numerous administrations to achieve a more diversified economy less reliant on the “chaebol”. Successive Korean governments have always been quick to provide support including capital injections to the policy banks when needed.
Recommendation Reviewed: June 16, 2025
Recommendation Changed: March 17, 2017
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.The Export-Import Bank of Korea
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: Korea
- Bond: EIBKOR 5.125 33
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 4.55%
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Fundamental View
AS OF 23 Jul 2025KEXIM is a pure policy bank that is directly and indirectly wholly owned by the government of the Republic of Korea, which is obliged under Article 37 of the Export-Import Bank of Korea Act to fund any losses that cannot be covered by the bank’s reserves.
While this is a solvency guarantee and does not explicitly guarantee the timely repayment of debt, we view it as inconceivable that the Korean authorities would fail to provide KEXIM with support in a timely manner, should this be needed, given its crucial policy role and close government links.
Business Description
AS OF 23 Jul 2025- KEXIM was set up in 1976 to support Korean companies in their overseas business through export credit guarantee programs, as well as providing finance for imports and for overseas investment. It provides funding for both short term trade and long term investment, and manages two government-entrusted funds: the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), a Korean official development assistance program, and the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF), an economic cooperation program to promote exchanges with North Korea. It is also a conduit through which the government doled out COVID-19 assistance to affected companies.
- Till 2030, KEXIM aims to preferentially focus on seven sectors (hydrogen energy, wind and solar power, rechargeable battery and energy storage systems (ESS), future mobility, 5G and next-generation semiconductors, pharmaceutical and healthcare, and digital technology and cultural content) which are considered new growth drivers of the Korean economy. It has historically focused on the shipbuilding and engineering & construction industries.
- KEXIM is 100% owned by the Korean government: 76% directly and the remainder through stakes held by the Bank of Korea (7%) and Korea Development Bank (17%). In contrast to peer policy banks IBK and KDB, KEXIM has remained more consistently a policy bank but its role has been adjusted to ensure it complements rather than competes with the Korean commercial banks.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 23 Jul 2025Previous Korean governments have made moves to privatise the other policy banks, but KEXIM has retained its policy bank role and government ownership, which are not likely to change.
Korea’s shipbuilders have long been the largest users of KEXIM’s services. Losses on exposure to the sector, in particular Daewoo Shipbuilding (DSME), pushed KEXIM into the red in 2016 but the government injected capital and its condition has recovered.
Together with KDB, KEXIM has played a key role in helping corporate Korea survive the COVID-19 induced crisis.
Key Metric
AS OF 23 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY20 | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Impairment Operating Profit / Average Assets | 1.2% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.1% |
| ROAA | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.8% |
| ROAE | 0.7% | 3.2% | 2.7% | 4.7% | 5.2% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.8% | 0.3% | 0.1% |
| Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 0.7% | 0.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.4% | 13.3% | 11.8% | 12.9% | 13.9% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 14.8% | 15.1% | 12.6% | 14.3% | 16.3% |
| Net Interest Margin (NIR/Ave Assets) | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.6% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 06 Jan 2026KEXIM is a wholly government owned policy bank benefiting from a Korean government solvency guarantee. It plays a key role in financing large-ticket exports in particular ships and large-scale overseas engineering projects. Its credit exposures include some industry and borrower concentrations especially to Korea’s shipbuilders and its financial performance has at times suffered. But the Korean government has always acted in a timely manner to endure its solvency, and with this strong backing we view it as a sound credit. We view its secondary levels as in line with where we would expect it to trade, and so continue with our Market perform recommendation.
Recommendation Reviewed: January 06, 2026
Recommendation Changed: September 22, 2020
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.UnionBank of the Philippines
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: Philippines
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Fundamental View
AS OF 19 May 2025The bank has historically generated higher returns than peers, but it geared its focus significantly towards the retail segment through acquiring Citi’s Philippine retail portfolio in 2022 and organic growth, which brought retail loans to more than half the total book.
Returns have suffered despite the good boost to core revenues, as asset quality deterioration from the riskier growth direction resulted in high credit costs which we have forewarned. Continued rounds of capital infusions from shareholders have thus been required. The reserve cover is maintained relatively thin.
Business Description
AS OF 19 May 2025- UnionBank of the Philippines was incorporated in 1968, and listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange in June 1992. Principal shareholders are Aboitiz Equity Ventures (49.66%), Insular Life (16%), & Social Security System (18%).
- UBP undertook mergers with International Corporate Bank in 1994 and International Exchange Bank in 2006. City Savings Bank (a thrift bank) was purchased in Jan 2013. City Savings received merger approval with PR Savings (a bank engaged in motorcycle, agri-machinery, & teachers' salary loans) in Dec 2018 from the BSP. It acquired the Citi Philippines retail franchise in 2022.
- The loan book is broadly split 38% wholesale loans and 62% retail loans (comprising 34% credit cards, 21% mortgages and 7% salary loans at the parent, 36% teachers loans, salary loans and motorcycle loans by the thrift bank subsidiary, City Savings Bank, and 1% UnionDigital) at Mar-25.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 19 May 2025Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign or reduction of shareholding by Aboitiz Equity Ventures would negatively impact UBP.
The bank’s aggressive retail expansion has improved the NIM, but negatively impacted overall profitability because of high credit costs (particularly since 2H23) which we have forewarned. We continue to dislike its focus on riskier retail given the already large loan book exposure. It is now focusing on lower risk, shorter term loans at UnionDigital, but the improvement in credit costs have been slow to come through given fallout from higher risk taking in other segments.
The bank however benefits from good shareholder support; it successfully completed a third stock rights offering of PHP 10 bn in 2Q24 (2023: PHP 12 bn; 2022: PHP 40 bn) to shore up capital. Lower opex from 2Q24 onwards is also aiding the bottomline.
Key Metric
AS OF 19 May 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1Q25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest Margin | 4.60% | 4.80% | 5.50% | 6.00% | 6.30% |
| Reported ROA (Cumulative) | 1.6% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 1.1% | 0.5% |
| Reported ROE (Cumulative) | 11.5% | 9.7% | 5.6% | 6.4% | 2.9% |
| PPP ROA | 2.59% | 2.17% | 2.31% | 3.08% | 2.74% |
| CET1 Ratio | 16.3% | 11.3% | 13.9% | 15.6% | 14.9% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 13.5% | 13.6% | 15.3% | 17.1% | 16.8% |
| Gross NPL Ratio | 5.00% | 4.80% | 6.27% | 6.89% | 6.90% |
| Net LDR | 63.1% | 67.4% | 73.8% | 77.3% | 74.6% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 272% | 148% | 163% | 250% | n/m |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 149% | 124% | 124% | 128% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 19 Aug 2025UBP’s NIM and core revenue generation is strong thanks to its pivot towards higher yielding retail via organic growth and acquiring Citi’s local retail portfolio. However, returns have suffered as the asset quality repercussions which we have forewarned from its aggressive growth strategy towards the risky retail segments have come through, with elevated credit costs since 2H23. It has slowed loan growth but credit costs have not shown signs of stabilisation given a still high appetite for risk. The reserve cover is maintained relatively thin. Continued shareholder support with yet another stock rights offering in 2Q24 has ensured sufficient capital for now. We drop coverage on UBP given the impending maturity of its sole $ bond in Oct-25.
Recommendation Reviewed: August 19, 2025
Recommendation Changed: January 01, 1970
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