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Fundamental View
AS OF 30 Jul 2025BDO Unibank (BDO) is the largest bank in the Philippines in terms of assets & market share.
Given its size and systemic importance, BDO is considered too big to fail and is strongly likely to be supported by its controlling shareholder SM Investments, as well as the Philippine government in times of stress.
BDO is widely viewed as the soundest bank in the country given its strong fundamentals, well-diversified businesses, and good management.
Business Description
AS OF 30 Jul 2025- BDO Unibank was established as Acme Savings Bank in 1968, and was then acquired by SM Investments in 1976. It became a commercial bank in 1994 and a universal bank in 1996.
- BDO was listed in May 2002. SM Investments remains the bank's largest shareholder with a 41% stake.
- BDO has expanded through a series of M&As. Among its key transactions, it merged with Dao Heng Bank Philippines in 2001, Banco Santander Philippines in 2003, UOB Philippines in 2005, Equitable PCI Bank in 2007, GE Money Bank in 2009, Citibank Savings, DB Trust and Real Bank in 2014, One Network Bank in 2015 (the largest rural bank in the Philippines), and RB Pandi's banking business in 2019. It also acquired the insurance business of Generali in the Philippines in 2016.
- BDO has the largest distribution network in the country and is ranked the largest bank in terms of consolidated resources, total assets, loans, deposits and trust funds under management.
- Its loan book is split 51% large corporates, 24% middle market, and 25% consumer at 2Q25. 41% of the consumer book comprises mortgages, 29% are credit cards, 13% are auto loans and the remaining are personal loans (13%) and others (5%).
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 30 Jul 2025Direct impact from US tariffs is limited given that the Philippines is not a major goods exporter, but there is likely to be some second order effects from a slowdown in regional and global growth.
Management said that loan growth from corporates has picked up and so healthy broad-based demand has returned across BDO’s market segments. It is comfortable with broadly maintaining the current loan mix, after several quarters of shifting towards retail loans.
We see few asset quality risks for BDO given a comfortable NPL cover (2Q25: 140%) and build up of the CET1 ratio (2Q25: 14.3%), as well as BDO’s large corporates book (51% of total loans) and underwriting track record.
We continue to anticipate a slight NIM squeeze in FY25 along with the declining policy rates. Another 1-2 more 25 bp rate cuts are anticipated from the BSP in 2H25 to support growth.
Any rating downgrade of the Philippine sovereign would negatively impact BDO.
Key Metric
AS OF 30 Jul 2025| PHP mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NIM | 4.05% | 4.14% | 4.37% | 4.35% | 4.30% |
| Reported ROA (Cumulative) | 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.6% |
| Reported ROE (Cumulative) | 10.4% | 13.0% | 15.2% | 15.1% | 13.9% |
| Equity/Assets | 11.7% | 11.3% | 11.5% | 11.8% | 11.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.6% | 13.4% | 13.8% | 14.1% | 14.3% |
| NPL ratio | 2.8% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.8% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.72% | 0.64% | 0.59% | 0.46% | 0.43% |
| PPP ROA | 2.1% | 2.3% | 2.7% | 2.5% | 2.3% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 145% | 141% | 123% | 132% | 126% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 124% | 124% | 124% | 122% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 19 Aug 2025BDO is the largest bank in the Philippines. Management is well-regarded, the business is well-diversified and it is the market leader in many business lines. The NIM has peaked with the turn in policy rates, but non-interest income is close to a third of operating income given good fee generation and overall core profitability is strong. We remain comfortable with BDO given the large corporate book and comfortable NPL cover, as well as underwriting track record, which provide comfort around the recently robust growth in retail loans. Capital has also been steadily built up with the CET1 ratio at 14.3% at 2Q25. BDO’s sole $ bond likely has low trading liquidity and hence limited opportunity for RV play given the short less than a year to maturity in Jan-26.
Recommendation Reviewed: August 19, 2025
Recommendation Changed: November 28, 2023
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Woori Financial Group
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Country: Korea
- Bond: WOORIB 4.875 28
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 5.108% (Indicative as of March 2)
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Fundamental View
AS OF 29 Jul 2025Woori FG’s performance record had been less consistent than some of its more commercially focused peers but improved in FY21-22. Its FY23 performance lagged behind its peers, but FY24 profit growth was peer-leading, partially thanks to not having the ELS compensation issue which hit the other three FGs in 1Q24. 1H25 performance was softer again due to several one-offs.
Asset quality used to be a strength with the lowest NPL ratios and credit costs among the four FGs but has deteriorated since 2Q23, and we no longer see a gap with the other FGs.
Capital standing is a relative weakness with the CET 1 ratio at 12.8% compared to 13.4-13.7% at peers.
Business Description
AS OF 29 Jul 2025- Woori's predecessor banks were rescued by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
- Woori Bank is one of Korea's 'Big Four' commercial banks. It previously owned two regional banks, Kwangju and Kyongnam, but these were spun off in 2014. Woori also sold its stake in Woori Investment Securities and its savings bank and life insurance arms to NH Financial Group.
- Woori set up a HoldCo (Woori FG) in January 2019 to expand into more diversified business lines, particularly investment banking. It used to have a HoldCo, but it was dissolved in 2014 when it was merged with Woori Bank.
- Its main subsidiaries are 100%-owned Woori Card, Woori Financial Capital (auto leasing), Woori Investment Bank and 72.3%-owned Woori Asset Trust. In August 2024, the group relaunched securities business by acquiring Korea Foss Securities and merging it with Woori Investment. The group also acquired a 75.34% stake in Tongyang Life and full ownership of ABL Life and has consolidated them since 1 July 2025.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 29 Jul 2025Woori FG was for many years majority-owned by the Korean government via the Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), but KDIC has steadily sold down its shareholding, and Woori purchased and cancelled the remaining shares in 2024. That said, Woori FG remains a large, systemically important bank with strong potential government backing if needed.
Woori FG is less diversified than KB and Shinhan, with most of its earnings coming from the bank and small contributions from the card and leasing businesses. The group has accelerated its M&A pace since 2024; it relaunched securities business and acquired two insurance companies. The group expects its non-bank profit contribution to rise from the current less than 10% to around 20%.
Its CET 1 ratio is 60-90 bp behind the other three FGs. Management plans to improve it to 13% by 2027.
Key Metric
AS OF 29 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 0.99% | 1.15% | 1.10% | 1.17% | 1.10% |
| ROA | 0.66% | 0.70% | 0.54% | 0.61% | 0.60% |
| ROE | 10.6% | 11.5% | 8.3% | 9.3% | 9.1% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.17% | 0.26% | 0.53% | 0.45% | 0.49% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.30% | 0.31% | 0.35% | 0.57% | 0.71% |
| Woori Bank CET1 Ratio | 13.0% | 12.7% | 13.2% | 13.1% | 14.2% |
| Equity/Assets | 6.45% | 6.58% | 6.71% | 6.83% | 6.69% |
| Net Interest Margin Bank + Card | 1.62% | 1.84% | 1.82% | 1.70% | 1.70% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 28 Jul 2025Woori FG was for some years the weakest of Korea’s Big 4 Financial Groups with a less consistent track record of managing risk and returns. Operating performance had shown an improvement for the past few years but disappointed in FY23. FY24 results were peer-leading, mainly supported by non-interest income, but 1H25 results lagged again. The group has been seeking opportunities to expand its non-bank businesses. Its new securities entity launched in August 2024 and the group is consolidating the two insurance subsidiaries. Profit contribution from non-bank is expected to increase to ~20%. Both the group and the bank CET1 ratios are behind peers. We have a Market perform recommendation but see the trading levels of its AT1 NC07/29 as attractive.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 28, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 24, 2017
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Fundamental View
AS OF 29 Jul 2025Shinhan FG was the best-managed of the large Korean financial groups over many years. During the Asian Financial Crisis, it took advantage of the opportunity to acquire competitors and other businesses, increasing its scale and expanding its business lines.
Its performance has been more variable in the past few years. After a bumpy 2020, it had a better FY21 and FY22, thanks to rising interest rates. However, operating performance turned weak again in FY23, and its FY24 profit growth was softer than peers, impacted by non-bank performance.
In addition to owning a Big 4 bank in Korea, Shinhan FG also has a diversified non-banking business portfolio, including a leading credit card company and a top 10 securities firm.
Business Description
AS OF 29 Jul 2025- Shinhan Financial Group (Shinhan FG) is one of Korea's most diversified financial groups and the holding company of the second largest Korean bank - Shinhan Bank. It also has credit cards, securities, asset management and insurance subsidiaries.
- Shinhan Bank was set up in 1982 with seed capital from Korean residents in Japan. It was more professionally managed than the heavily politicised older banks and came through the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in relatively good shape, taking the opportunity to acquire the larger and much longer-established Chohung Bank in 2003.
- In 2007, it made another timely acquisition, buying LG Card from its creditors after it failed during the 2003 Korean consumer lending crisis. Shinhan Card is the largest card issuer in Korea.
- Shinhan is also looking for overseas opportunities where growth is strong and Korean businesses have a presence, with a focus on Vietnam (where Shinhan Card also bought a consumer finance business in 2019) and Indonesia.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 29 Jul 2025As one of Korea’s “Big Four” financial groups, we believe Shinhan FG would likely receive governmental support if needed.
Asset quality pressure has been rising from domestic real estate project financing at non-bank subsidiaries, with credit costs rising from very low levels. Management has revised its FY25 credit costs outlook up from around 40 bp to the mid-to-high 40 bp range.
Loan growth has been soft this year due to both weaker demand and the need to defend its 13% CET 1 ratio target; it will also face tighter regulation on mortgage lending like its peers.
Profit growth may encounter challenges if there is volatility in the KRW, which could lead to significant FX losses, or if the high-rate environment in the US persists, causing further overseas CRE valuation losses.
Key Metric
AS OF 29 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.11% | 1.10% | 1.23% | 1.19% | 1.35% |
| ROA | 0.66% | 0.72% | 0.66% | 0.63% | 0.84% |
| ROE | 9.2% | 10.0% | 8.6% | 8.4% | 11.4% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.28% | 0.34% | 0.57% | 0.51% | 0.47% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.39% | 0.41% | 0.56% | 0.71% | 0.80% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.10% | 12.79% | 13.17% | 13.06% | 13.59% |
| Equity/Assets | 7.3% | 7.6% | 7.8% | 7.6% | 7.6% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.81% | 1.96% | 1.97% | 1.93% | 1.90% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 28 Jul 2025Shinhan FG is one of the four nation-wide commercial banking groups in Korea, with a leading credit card arm. It had over many years the best operating track record, but have shown more consistent performance with peers in recent years. More recently, its 1H25 returns remained high and just behind KBFG. Its CET 1 ratio was also slightly behind KBFG but leading the other two peers. However, it failed to deliver its commitment to enhancing its NPL coverage ratio in 2Q25, although the figure remained at a comfortable level. We have a Market perform recommendation at both group and bank levels.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 28, 2025
Recommendation Changed: September 22, 2020
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Reliance Industries
- Sector: Manufacturing
- Sub Sector: Diversified Conglomerates
- Country: India
- Region: India
- Bond: RILIN 4.125 25
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 5.531% (Indicative as of March 2)
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Fundamental View
AS OF 29 Jul 2025We are comfortable with Reliance’s large diversified scale of operations and dominant presence in various key sectors (refining, petrochemicals, retail and telecom), which allows for earnings resilience.
We believe a lackluster oils-to-chemicals outlook is well mitigated by strong outlooks for telecom and retail.
Plans to ramp up its renewable energy business could provide the next leg of growth and improve ESG perception.
Reliance incurs significant capex that has weighed on free cash flow generation, though we acknowledge its historically prudent financial management and robust credit metrics that provide ample elbowroom for some credit profile deterioration.
Business Description
AS OF 29 Jul 2025- RIL is an Indian diversified conglomerate engaged in oil & gas refining, marketing, petrochemicals, organized retail, telecom and digital services, amongst others. It is the largest company in India by revenue, profits, exports and market capitalization (INR 20 tn).
- It is the second largest refiner in India and produces petroleum products such as petrol, high-speed diesel (HSD), aviation turbine fuel (ATF), LPG and lubricants.
- It is the largest petrochemicals producer in India, boasting production of ~38 mn tons in FY20. Through its integrated Jamnagar refinery complex, it produces Polymers/Plastics, Elastomers (synthetic rubber) and Polyester products.
- It is the largest retailer in India in terms of revenue. It operates 18.8k stores (as of March 2024) to sell products ranging from consumer electronics, fashion and lifestyle, grocery, petrol retail and telecom and digital services. It launched its online retail channel, 'JioMart', in December 2019.
- Reliance Jio is the largest mobile telecom operator by subscriber base (482 mn as of March 2024) in India and boasts the widest 4G wireless network in the country.
- In 2021, RIL announced investments to the tune of INR 750 bn/ $10 bn (for next 3 years) to build a renewable energy ecosystem which will include 4 giga factories. Set to be located in Gujarat, the factories will produce solar modules, hydrogen, fuel cells and battery grid to store electricity. Long-term goals also include building 100 GW of PV solar plants by 2030.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 29 Jul 2025Reliance’s O2C (oil-to chemicals) margins remain under pressure from global tariff-led growth slowdown concerns and persisting oversupply conditions in China.
Reliance incurs significant capex at historically high levels, particularly from continued investments into its O2C, retail, and nascent renewables businesses. This has weighed on its free cash flow generation, though we take comfort in Reliance’s historically prudent financial management and robust credit metrics.
Reliance faces key-person risk; 65-year old Chairman Mukesh Ambani has begun to hand over the reins of the company’s different business divisions to his children.
Key Metric
AS OF 29 Jul 2025| INR bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Book Cap | 25.9% | 26.4% | 35.3% | 33.1% | 31.9% |
| Net Debt to Book Cap | 24.3% | 23.4% | 29.9% | 26.1% | 24.8% |
| Debt/Total Equity | 34.9% | 35.9% | 54.5% | 49.6% | 46.9% |
| Debt/Total Assets | 21.1% | 21.3% | 28.1% | 26.1% | 24.3% |
| Gross Leverage | 3.5x | 2.9x | 3.2x | 2.8x | 2.9x |
| Net Leverage | 3.2x | 2.6x | 2.7x | 2.2x | 2.2x |
| Interest Coverage | 3.1x | 5.7x | 5.0x | 7.0x | 6.8x |
| EBITDA Margin | 16.6% | 15.3% | 15.9% | 17.7% | 16.9% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 29 Jul 2025We have a Market perform recommendation on Reliance (RIL); we prefer its 2032 and would avoid its 2045 and 2052. We see room for RIL 2032 to tighten 10-15 bp versus Bharti 2031 and PTTGC 2032. We like RIL’s large diversified operations and dominant market shares in key sectors (refining, retail and telecom) that boosts earnings resilience. Its growing renewable business could aid ESG investor sentiment too. While we acknowledge persisting weakness in the O2C segment and RIL’s elevated capex needs, we think the impact is mitigated by RIL’s prudent financial management and healthy credit metrics that provide ample elbowroom for some credit profile deterioration. While key man risk remains a concern, we take comfort in gradually progressing succession plans.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 29, 2025
Recommendation Changed: June 30, 2021
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Fundamental View
AS OF 29 Jul 2025KB Financial Group has grown steadily through the acquisitions of non-bank companies in Korea and small banks in Indonesia and Cambodia. Its banking subsidiary, Kookmin Bank, operates the largest branch network in Korea, with a particularly strong presence in the retail market. This makes it a systemically important bank, with strong potential government support if needed.
The group has a good track record, and its large mass-market franchise gives it a strong customer base. It has a well-diversified business and the highest CET1 ratio among the four major financial groups.
Business Description
AS OF 29 Jul 2025- KB Financial Group (KBFG) is a well-diversified and well-run group. Its main subsidiaries, in addition to Kookmin Bank (KB), are Kookmin Card, KB Insurance, KB Securities, KB Capital (leasing), and KB Asset Management.
- KB was the result of several mergers after the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. Its main predecessors were Citizen's National Bank and Housing & Commercial Bank, both retail-focused banks that have given it the leading position in Korean retail banking.
- For the near term, the group doesn't expect further M&A. It has looked for growth overseas, focusing on Indonesia (where it has taken a 67% stake in Bank Bukopin) and Cambodia (it took a 100% shareholding in Prasac, a micro-finance lender, over 2020-21). It also bought Prudential Financial's Korean insurance business in 2020, which was subsequently merged with KB Insurance.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 29 Jul 2025As one of Korea’s “Big Four” financial groups, we believe that KBFG would likely receive governmental support if needed.
Credit costs normalised to 45 bp in FY24 (from a spike to 73 bp in FY23) – a level more consistent with peers, but 1H25 credit costs at 55 bp were higher than peers again; however, it also has the highest NPL coverage ratio among the Big 4.
KBFG has the highest NIM among the four FGs, largely thanks to the highest NIM at Kookmin bank among the Big 4 banks.
KBFG is expanding by business line and overseas with a focus on Indonesia and Cambodia—markets with more favourable demographics, growth potential, and profit margins than Korea but also more risk. The profit plan for the Indonesian subsidiary has been slower than expected, with it finally turning profitable in 1H25.
Key Metric
AS OF 29 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.14% | 1.05% | 1.36% | 1.37% | 1.49% |
| ROA | 0.69% | 0.57% | 0.65% | 0.68% | 0.90% |
| ROE | 10.2% | 8.8% | 9.1% | 9.7% | 13.0% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.31% | 0.45% | 0.73% | 0.45% | 0.55% |
| NPL ratio | 0.33% | 0.34% | 0.57% | 0.65% | 0.72% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.5% | 13.2% | 13.6% | 13.5% | 13.7% |
| Equity/Assets | 7.3% | 7.9% | 8.2% | 7.9% | 7.8% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.83% | 1.96% | 2.08% | 2.03% | 1.98% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 28 Jul 2025KBFG is one of the “Big 4” finanical groups in South Korea, and its banking subsidiary, Kookmin Bank, enjoys the strongest franchise with a particularly strong presence in the retail market. This makes it a systemically important bank, with strong potential government support if needed. KBFG has a good track record and a well-diversified business. Capital standing is the key strength, with the current highest group CET1 ratio. Credit costs are relatively high compared to peers in recent years, but its NPL coverage ratio is also the highest. It delivered the highest returns among the Big 4 in 1H25, and asset quality metrics showed improvement.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 28, 2025
Recommendation Changed: September 22, 2020
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Fundamental View
AS OF 29 Jul 2025Hana Financial Group (Hana FG) struggled for several years to make its acquisition of the former Korea Exchange Bank a success, but results improved dramatically in 2015 as revenues grew and cost efficiencies improved. It has produced strong results since 2020.
The group is looking for inorganic growth in its non-bank businesses as it has fallen behind Shinhan FG and KBFG in this area, but has so far shied away from a large acquisition.
Hana Bank has the highest CET 1 ratio among the Korean Big 4 banks.
Business Description
AS OF 29 Jul 2025- Hana FG is the third-largest financial group in South Korea. From small origins as a finance company in the 1970s, after the 1997 Asian crisis, Hana grew by acquiring three other banks, including the much older Seoul Bank, which had a banking and trust management business.
- Hana FG bought Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) from Lone Star in 2012 after overcoming many hurdles, but due to staff union opposition, it could not merge with Hana Bank until 2015.
- Hana FG's overseas business is smaller than its peers, and is complemented by KEB's extensive international operations. KEB was started in 1967 as a government-owned bank specializing in foreign exchange. It had a leading share in FX transactions and trade finance among Korean banks.
- Hana FG has shown good growth in its credit card and securities non-bank businesses, but is less diversified than its larger peers KB and Shinhan, which have also acquired insurance companies. Its latest acquisition (in 2019) was a 15% stake in Vietnam's state-owned Bank for Investment & Development (BIDV). In 2023, Hana FG decided not to proceed with the acquisition of KDB Life Insurance after two months of due diligence.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 29 Jul 2025Hana FG’s credit costs at ~30 bp in FY24 and 1H25 were lower than peers (in the range of 40-60 bp). However, the group’s NPL coverage ratio was also ~20-30 ppt behind peers.
NIMs are lower than those of KB and Shinhan at both the group and bank levels. The profit contribution from non-bank entities to group profits is also lagging behind these two peers. Both metrics are comparable to Woori’s.
Non-banking businesses have underperformed in recent years, with profit contributions falling from 20–30% in 2019–2021 to around 10%, primarily due to elevated provisions for domestic real estate project financing and valuation losses related to overseas commercial real estate.
Key Metric
AS OF 29 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Profit ROA | 1.07% | 1.10% | 1.11% | 1.00% | 1.13% |
| ROA | 0.74% | 0.66% | 0.59% | 0.61% | 0.73% |
| ROE | 10.9% | 10.1% | 9.0% | 9.1% | 10.8% |
| Provisions/Loans | 0.16% | 0.34% | 0.46% | 0.32% | 0.30% |
| NPL Ratio | 0.32% | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.62% | 0.75% |
| CET1 Ratio | 13.8% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 13.4% |
| Equity/Assets | 6.8% | 6.4% | 6.6% | 6.7% | 6.7% |
| Net Interest Margin | 1.66% | 1.83% | 1.82% | 1.69% | 1.71% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 28 Jul 2025Hana FG grew through acquisitions but only in 2015 was it able to merge its two main bank units to form KEB-Hana Bank. Hana’s management has a good record but for some years struggled to extract value from its acquisitions. Its performance for the past few years has generally been strong. More focus has been put on RWA management and capital enhancement since 2H24. There is potential for further improvements in the non-bank segment. Hana’s credit costs were lower than those of its peers, but this has also resulted in the lowest NPL coverage ratio among the four FGs. The group aims to maintain a CET1 ratio of 13-13.5%. We have a Market perform recommendation at both group and bank levels.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 28, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 24, 2017
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.T-Mobile US
- Sector: Technology Media and Telecommunications
- Sub Sector: Telecommunications
- Region: US
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Fundamental View
AS OF 28 Jul 2025We expect T-Mobile will maintain its position as the industry leader in postpaid phone net additions, service revenue and EBITDA growth in 2025. We think the company has significant subscriber runway remaining in the suburban/rural and enterprise markets.
Adjusted net leverage (2.3x at 2Q25) is 0.3x/0.6x lower than AT&T/Verizon. Relatively strong EBITDA growth and a modest dividend commitment results in greater financial flexibility than peers.
T-Mobile benefits from the strongest spectrum position in the industry, including an average of 181 MHz in the 2.5 GHz band, which results in better 5G network coverage than AT&T and Verizon.
Business Description
AS OF 28 Jul 2025- TMUS is the one of the top 3 U.S. wireless carriers and is owned ~51% by Deutsche Telekom (DT). On April 1, 2020, TMUS and S completed an all-stock merger, valuing S at an EV of approximately $59.7 bn.
- TMUS ended 2024 with ~130 mn customers, including 104 mn postpaid and 25 mn prepaid.
- TMUS reaches 330+mn POPs with its Extended Range 5G network (using the 600 MHz spectrum) and reaches 300mn customers with its Ultra Capacity 5G.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 28 Jul 2025Converged wireless/broadband offers from cable operators raises the risk of pricing pressure in the mature consumer wireless market.
The company has not shied away from acquisitions. T-Mobile recently acquired Mint Mobile, two FTTH JVs and will soon close its purchase of US Cellular. So far, M&A has not had much impact on T-Mobile’s credit metrics, but further moves into FTTH may be received poorly by investors.
With T-Mobile’s credit rating now comfortably in the mid-BBB area and leverage in the vicinity of the group’s mid-2x target area, we expect the company’s capital allocation to shift toward shareholder returns.
Key Metric
AS OF 28 Jul 2025| $ mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | LTM 2Q25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 80,118 | 79,571 | 78,558 | 81,400 | 84,052 |
| Organic Revenue Growth | 7.3% | (0.7%) | (1.3%) | 3.6% | 6.3% |
| EBITDA | 26,924 | 27,821 | 29,428 | 31,864 | 32,965 |
| Adj. EBITDA Growth | (64.0%) | 33.9% | 5.8% | 8.3% | 8.0% |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin | 33.6% | 35.0% | 37.5% | 39.1% | 39.2% |
| CapEx % of Sales | 15.4% | 17.6% | 12.5% | 10.9% | 10.7% |
| Total Debt | 79,574 | 78,425 | 83,586 | 84,255 | 88,871 |
| Net Debt | 72,943 | 73,918 | 78,451 | 78,846 | 78,612 |
| Gross Leverage | 3.4x | 3.0x | 2.9x | 2.7x | 2.7x |
| Net Leverage | 3.0x | 2.7x | 2.6x | 2.4x | 2.3x |
| Interest Coverage | 7.2x | 8.0x | 8.3x | 8.7x | 8.7x |
| FCF as % of Debt | 13.7% | 13.2% | 19.2% | 23.0% | 22.7% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 22 Sep 2025We expect TMUS will once again lead the Big 3 in major KPIs in 2025, including ~6% EBITDA growth. We view earnings/growth visibility as higher than peers, with the outlook supported by its leading 5G mid-band coverage (over 300 million PoPs with ~200 MHz) and historical under-penetration in rural and enterprise markets. T-Mobile also boasts the lowest leverage (~2.3x) and strongest FCF/debt ratio amongst the Wireless Big 3, while its rising FCF generation and comparatively low dividend commitment provide flexibility for selective M&A. Despite the rising focus on convergence, we believe TMUS will stick with its off-balance sheet strategy for FTTH JVs and view the risk of a transformational broadband acquisition (ILEC or cable) as extremely low.
Recommendation Reviewed: September 22, 2025
Recommendation Changed: March 18, 2021
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Fundamental View
AS OF 25 Jul 2025IBK benefits from a legally binding solvency guarantee from the Korean government and is viewed as a Korean quasi-sovereign issuer. The bank is listed, but remains majority state-owned. Previous governments had proposed privatizing it, but subsequent governments scrapped these plans. The government intends to keep its stake above 50%, and wants IBK to focus on lending to SMEs and provide earlier stage investment capital.
IBK manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks.
Business Description
AS OF 25 Jul 2025- IBK was established under its own Act in 1961 to assist the development of Korea's small business sector. It claims a 24% market share in SME lending.
- It was listed in the early 1990s, but was re-nationalised following heavy losses in the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. It was re-listed in 2003, and is majority owned by the government which holds 59.5%; the National Pension Scheme holds 5.6%, and other policy banks have small stakes (7.2% by Korea Development Bank and 1.8% by the Export-Import Bank of Korea).
- Under Article 43 of the IBK Act, if the bank incurs losses they should be set against its reserves and "if the reserves are not sufficient the Government shall assume the remaining loss". Although this is a solvency guarantee and not an explicit guarantee for the timely payment of debts, we believe the Korean government will ensure IBK is in a position to make such timely payments.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 25 Jul 2025The bank’s ratings are closely tied to the Korean sovereign’s ratings due to its quasi-sovereign status.
Its ratings and its default risk should therefore not be impacted by any deterioration in its financials, provided the government continues to inject new capital when needed, which it is expected to.
Its policy mandate requires it to use at least 70% of its funding for SMEs. Risks are mitigated by its granular SME exposures which are more than 80% secured, including guarantee from state-owned credit guarantee agencies. Korean governments have also always been quick to provide support including capital injections to IBK when needed, with the most recent injection of KRW 1.3 tn during the COVID.
Key Metric
AS OF 25 Jul 2025| KRW bn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Provision Operating Profit / Average Assets | 1.30% | 1.49% | 1.59% | 1.39% | 1.34% |
| ROAA | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| ROAE | 9.2% | 9.5% | 8.8% | 8.1% | 8.8% |
| Provisions/Average Loans | 0.34% | 0.50% | 0.67% | 0.52% | 0.44% |
| Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans | 0.85% | 0.85% | 1.05% | 1.34% | 1.37% |
| CET1 Ratio | 11.3% | 11.1% | 11.3% | 11.3% | 11.7% |
| Total Equity/Total Assets | 6.92% | 6.79% | 7.10% | 7.25% | 7.18% |
| NIM | 1.51% | 1.78% | 1.79% | 1.70% | 1.59% |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 16 Jun 2025IBK is not wholly government owned – 59.5% direct government ownership, 7.2% KDB and 1.8% KEXIM – but is a policy bank benefiting from a Korean government solvency guarantee. For a policy bank it also has a fairly good track record and manages the difficult feat of combining its policy role to support Korean SMEs with performance that compares creditably with Korean commercial banks. As the leading lender to Korea’s medium and small businesses, IBK plays a key role in the country’s economy, enhanced by the longstanding objective of numerous administrations to achieve a more diversified economy less reliant on the “chaebol”. Successive Korean governments have always been quick to provide support including capital injections to the policy banks when needed.
Recommendation Reviewed: June 16, 2025
Recommendation Changed: March 17, 2017
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Siam Commercial Bank
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Country: Thailand
- Region: Thailand
- Bond: SCBTB 3.9 24
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 5.573% (Indicative as of March 2)
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Fundamental View
AS OF 24 Jul 2025Siam Commercial Bank (SCBTB) has been a sound and profitable bank. It has a focus on the retail segment and targets to increase margins by growing its non-traditional banking businesses. It announced a major business overhaul in September 2021 to establish a new parent company called SCB X to segregate the group’s core banking services (Gen 1) from its new fintech and digital businesses and to enable greater flexibility and independence.
Recent credit costs however have been elevated due to the riskier exposure that these entail. However, profitability remains healthy and the capital buffer is strong at both the Holdco (SCB X) and Bank (SCB) level.
Business Description
AS OF 24 Jul 2025- Siam Commercial Bank was founded as the "Book Club" in 1904. In 1907, it started operating as a commercial bank and was renamed as "The Siam Commercial Bank". It completed its IPO on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1976.
- The bank is 23.58% owned by the King of Thailand, and a further 23.32% is owned by the Vayupak Fund 1, which is controlled by the government.
- SCB is the fourth largest Thai bank by assets and is known for its robust retail franchise.
- Its loan profile was 36% corporate, 17% SME, and 47% retail as of June 2025.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 24 Jul 2025We see a meaningful impact to the Thai economy from potential US tariffs, with ripple effects in the form of lower bank NIMs (as more rate cuts come through to support growth) and higher credit costs than earlier guided for this year. Moody’s also downgraded its rating outlook on the Thailand sovereign, and consequently the Thai banks including KBANK, to negative on 29 April 2025, citing increased risks to Thailand’s economic and fiscal strength, partly due to the potential impact of new US tariffs.
The group’s business overhaul and strategic direction comes with higher credit costs from the riskier target segments at the Gen2/3 businesses given the challenged macroeconomic environment. Credit costs may rise again in 2026 there is a bad outcome on tariffs. However, SCB X’s higher NIM and low-40%s cost-income ratio should provide comfortable room for that to be absorbed. We also take comfort in the ringfencing of the bank unit (SCB) from the Group’s riskier business units, and management’s minimum CET1 ratio of 16% at SCB.
Loan growth is likely to remain modest in FY25 given a still soft growth outlook for Thailand.
Key Metric
AS OF 24 Jul 2025| THB mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPP ROA | 2.63% | 2.50% | 2.88% | 2.87% | 2.97% |
| ROA | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.4% |
| ROE | 8.4% | 8.3% | 9.3% | 9.1% | 10.4% |
| Equity/Assets | 13.4% | 13.5% | 14.1% | 14.2% | 13.9% |
| CET1 Ratio | 17.6% | 17.7% | 17.6% | 17.7% | 17.8% |
| Reported NPL ratio | 3.79% | 3.34% | 3.44% | 3.37% | 3.31% |
| Provisions/Loans | 1.84% | 1.45% | 1.82% | 1.76% | 1.64% |
| Gross LDR | 93% | 93% | 99% | 97% | 97% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 202% | 216% | 217% | 212% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 22 Jul 2025SCB is the 4th largest bank in Thailand and has a leading retail franchise. Asset quality during COVID was poor. It created a new HoldCo structure (SCBX) in 2022 to shift digital units and unsecured retail loans outside the bank, and pledged a >16% CET1 ratio at SCB. The BOT has also ringfenced SCB which further reduces the risk for the SCBTB bonds. The NIM has been strong vs. peers as expected. We expect there to still be a sizable restructured book at SCB, and with higher retail exposure amid elevated household debt have resulted in credit costs staying high, but these have been comfortably absorbed. We see a significant impact to the Thai economy and banks from potential US tariffs, with a bad tariffs outcome potentially leading to higher credit costs again. We have an Underperform rec.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 22, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 22, 2025
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Search topics about wealth insights and investments.Kasikornbank
- Sector: Financial Services
- Sub Sector: Banks
- Region: Thailand
- Bond: KBANK 5.458 28
- Indicative Yield-to-Maturity (YTM): 4.77%
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Fundamental View
AS OF 24 Jul 2025Kasikornbank (KBANK) is a historically sound and profitable bank.
Capitalisation is strong and the bank has among the highest CASA ratios in the banking sector. Asset quality took a surprise turn for the worse in 4Q22 due to its larger SME exposure and the bank has since focused on de-risking its portfolio. Credit costs are improving but remain elevated.
Margins are high compared to most other Thai banks we cover as a result of its strong SME franchise, but the shift in growth focus to the safer but lower yielding segments has diminished its margin lead.
Business Description
AS OF 24 Jul 2025- KBank is currently the second largest bank in Thailand. It briefly was the largest from 2018 until mid-2020, upon which Bangkok Bank completed its acquisition of Indonesia's Bank Permata and took its place.
- KBank's history can be traced back to 1945 when it was first established as Thai Farmers Bank. It was listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1976 and changed its name to Kasikornbank in 2003.
- As of March 2025, the bank's loan mix by segment consists of 41% corporate, 26% SME, 28% retail and 5% others.
- KBank is known for its strong SME franchise. Its focus industries in SME are construction, construction materials, food & beverage, and hardware.
- It partially owns a life insurance company, Muang Thai Life.
Risk & Catalysts
AS OF 24 Jul 2025We see a significant impact to the Thai economy from potential US tariffs, with ripple effects in the form of lower bank NIMs and higher credit costs than earlier guided for this year. Moody’s also downgraded its rating outlook on the Thailand sovereign, and consequently the Thai banks including KBANK, to negative on 29 April 2025, citing increased risks to Thailand’s economic and fiscal strength, partly due to the potential impact of new US tariffs.
KBANK still has a higher retail/SME loan mix and sizable restructured loans portfolio (~8.3% of total loans) and so credit costs remain elevated compared to peers, with guidance now revised to 165-170 bp for 2025. Credit costs may rise again in 2026 if there is a bad outcome on tariffs. KBANK’s higher NIM and low-40%s cost-income ratio however should provide comfortable room for that to be absorbed. The focus on safer segments seems is also helping to rein in credit costs.
KBANK’s switch to focus on safer segments however will weigh on the NIM, which is compounded by more rate cuts from the BOT to support growth. The NIM though currently remains higher than most of its peers.
Key Metric
AS OF 24 Jul 2025| THB mn | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | 1H25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPP ROA | 2.38% | 2.36% | 2.52% | 2.60% | 2.61% |
| ROA | 0.98% | 0.86% | 0.99% | 1.14% | 1.21% |
| ROAE | 8.3% | 7.3% | 8.2% | 8.9% | 9.2% |
| Equity / Assets | 13.1% | 13.4% | 13.9% | 14.9% | 15.0% |
| CET1 Ratio | 15.5% | 15.9% | 16.5% | 17.4% | 17.7% |
| Gross NPL ratio | 3.76% | 3.19% | 3.19% | 3.20% | 3.18% |
| Provisions / Loans | 1.73% | 2.11% | 2.08% | 1.90% | 1.62% |
| Gross LDR | 93% | 91% | 92% | 91% | 89% |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 174% | 164% | 195% | 184% | n/m |
CreditSight View Comment
AS OF 22 Jul 2025Kasikornbank is the 2nd largest bank in Thailand. We are cautious about its one third loan book exposure to SMEs given the macro backdrop; credit costs spiked in 4Q22 mainly from the SME book and high yield small ticket lending, and the restructured loan book remains sizable compared to peers. The bank however has switched to focus on safer segments, which is weighing on the NIM but helped to stabilize credit costs. Credit costs remain fairly elevated but comfortably absorbed thus far. Capital is high with CET1 above 17%. The NIM though is on a decline from rates coming down. We see a significant impact to the Thai economy and banks from potential US tariffs, with a bad tariffs outcome potentially leading to higher credit costs again. We have an Underperform rec.
Recommendation Reviewed: July 22, 2025
Recommendation Changed: April 22, 2025
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